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ABSTRACT
Seasons Past: Wildcat Strikes and the Smith-Connally Act During World War II

Andrew McCloskey
This thesis explores the phenomenon of wildcat strikes during World War II in the United States,
the raging public opinion about these wartime strikes, and the passage of the War Labor Disputes
Act (popularly known as the Smith-Connally Act) of 1943. Broadly, this thesis examines the
wellsprings of working-class anger and frustration which underscored the spontaneous wildcat
strikes, the No-Strike Pledge, and the various factions within the public’s perception of these
strikes. This thesis furthermore analyzes the congressional debate surrounding the SmithConnally Act and the American public’s reaction to the passage of this restrictive legislation.
Finally, this thesis posits that the public opinion polls, which spurred the perception of a unified
populace against labor unions, were skewed by clear anti-labor biases in the news media and
loaded questions in these public opinion polls.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Historiography
On February 18, 1945 in a private letter, William Fenimore, a West Virginia soldier
fighting in the Pacific, railed against the wartime strikes he had read about in newspapers
distributed overseas. Strikers, who were “lazy loafers,” who were “too coddled and pampered,”
were shirking their jobs, and preventing vital supplies from reaching the fight men.1 “We may
have,” he declared, “the guts to win this war, but guts against cannon aren’t such a big thing.”2
As Fenimore saw it, too many selfish people believed the war was virtually won and they ought
to be given the “cold, bare facts of life over here.”3 Upon the death of their loved one, instead of
simply writing your son has been killed in action, he advised officers to write “your son “’had his
guts blown out by a hidden Jap .25 caliber machine gun on Leyte”4 In his letter, he asked “have
you ever seen an American trying to hold his guts in his body with one hand and fire his rifle
with the other, with blood running all over his hand.”5 Images like these, he urged, “should not
be hidden from the American people.”6 Fenimore was not alone in condemning wartime
strikers. Indeed, as historian William O'Neill observed "no domestic issue aroused more passion
than the rights of labor unions," especially the right to strike.7
Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, asked
unions to take a No-Strike Pledge in the name of patriotism and winning the war. This pledge
was met with enthusiastic support from labor leaders who volunteered to forsake their most
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effective tool of bargaining. At the same time unequal burdens of sacrifice roiled the working
class and strikes proliferated throughout the country. This contradiction sparked a widespread,
spirited, and at times bitterly hostile public debate about labor’s broken promise. In 1943, the
uproar over labor strikes led to the passage of the Smith-Connolly Act, which was designed to
curtail these strikes and to reduce the power of unions. This thesis focuses on the public debate
over the working-class militancy during World War II era, particularly wartime strikes, both
those sanctioned by union leadership, like the United Mine Workers strikes and unsanctioned
wildcat strikes, called by local union leaders and even the rank-and-file.
American workers and their unions faced the prospect of a second world war with
trepidation. From their experience in World War I they knew that mobilization for war brought
both opportunities and dangers. During World War I, to help ensure labor peace, the federal
government recognized the right of workers to representation in the workplace and millions of
workers surged into labor organizations, which won improved working conditions and better
wages. Workers spoke of the establishment of a new industrial democracy, but this was a shortlived dream, as unions were crushed by a post-war business offensive to roll back union gains
and lost their attraction to some workers in the midst of the economic boom of the 1920s.
In the thirties, however, the Great Depression resulted in an increase in labor activism as
workers lost their jobs and security. Worker militancy contributed to the passage of the National
Labor Relations Act, which legitimized labor unions. Especially after the temporary economic
upturn in 1937, their new rights to organize combined with worker militancy, including new
tactics like sit-down strikes, helped enable the newly-formed Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO) to make inroads in organizing critical mass production industries, such
as auto, steel, rubber and electrical. Still the CIO was relatively weak. Major firms, like Ford
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Motor Company and Bethlehem Steel, were still outside union ranks, and powerful business
leaders remained dedicated to destroying organized labor, thus setting the stage for a new round
of conflict between business and labor during World War II.8
In 1939 after war broke out in Europe, the United States, which had a pitifully small
military, began slowly to strengthen its defensive capacity. Mobilization, both in terms of
increasing the size of the military and increasing armaments, intensified in 1940 and 1941 as
Germany and Japan marched across Europe and Asia. Rearming the United States and fulfilling
war orders from England and the Soviet Union made possible by the weakening and then ending
of the Neutrality Acts meant a vast increase in production which required an increase in
manpower. Beginning in 1940, an emboldened CIO sought to complete the organization of the
steel and auto industries and to organize rising war industries like ship building and aeronautics.
The CIO’s competitor, the American Federation of Labor, also sought to enlist the growing
workforce into its ranks. Roosevelt sought to stave off conflict resulting from these organizing
campaigns by establishing a National Defense Mediation Board to prevent strikes. Still in 1941
as William O’Neill notes there were “4,228 walkouts involving some 2.4 million men and
women, making it the biggest strike year since 1919.”9 Perhaps the most notorious strike, a
wildcat strike, occurred in June 1941 at North American Aviation, a major fighter aircraft
manufacturer. The government responded by seizing the plant and threatening to end the
deferment of any male workers who refused to return to work.10
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It was clear that an agreement needed to be reached if the United States was to function
as a total-war economy and from that need, the No Strike Pledge was born. This was a way for
both government and labor unions to solve a mutual problem – inflation. During World War
One, inflation spiraled out of control and the governments efforts failed. This led to a doubling of
living expenses and a 145% increase on the price of food.11 Strikes raged and workers chaffed
under their stagnant wages. In 1940, the prospect of a repeating act of inflation and wage-fueled
strikes seemed grimly certain. The number of strikes and labor disputes between December and
March, 1941 doubled, the overwhelming majority of these were unsanctioned and wildcat.12 The
government needed to freeze wages, which was the easiest way to combat runaway inflation.
However, static wages make for angry workers and unions would be impotent to demand higher
wages. The No-Strike Pledge was a way out of this gordian knot. If unions would keep their
workers from striking, a 1942 maintenance of membership agreement would make all new
defense workers automatic union members and thus swelling labor’s members to unheard of
heights.13 The year 1942 had 2,968 strikes (despite the fact that workers felt the most patriotic
and responsible for winning the war which the Allies were badly losing), followed by 3,752 in
1943.14 The number of strikes rose sharply in 1944 with 4,956 followed by an astonishing 2,971
work stoppages in the first six months of 1945.15 The overwhelming majority of these wartime
strikes were unsanctioned and spontaneous wildcat outbursts from frustrated workers. It is
noteworthy that these wildcats were called quickies because the majority of them were over
specific grievances and lasted less than a week (60.6% in 1942, 80.0% in 1943, 77.3% in
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1944).16 There are a few notable exceptions where large union sanction strikes slowed
production, including the 1941 North American Aviation and the 1943 United Mine Workers
strikes.
The existing literature on wildcat strikes during World War II is fairly extensive and
offers clues to the parameters of this public debate. Some of the historiography is divided along
the lines of major labor federations and their affiliates involved. Andrew Kersten’s Labor's
Home Front: The American Federation of Labor During World War II17, Robert Zieger’s The
CIO: 1935-195518, and Nelson Lichtenstein’s Labor’s War at Home: The CIO in World War II19
each analyze wildcat strikes through the AFL (American Federation of Labor) and the CIO
(Congress of Industrial Organizations). These works illuminate the underlying reasons about
why unions violated their pledge. Other works look at the strikes from the perspective of
different industries such as Martin Glaberman’s Wartime Strikes: The Struggle Against the NoStrike Pledge in the UAW During World War II which focuses on the reception of the pledge by
automobile workers.20 Historians have also chosen to look at strikes through the lens of social
history. Both Robert Zieger’s American Workers American Unions21 and George Lipsitz’s
Rainbow at Midnight: Labor and Culture in the 1940’s22 concentrate on the racial aspects and
organizational struggles that typified these strikes (rank and file union members against union
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leadership and factory workers against factory management). James Atleson’s Labor and the
Wartime State: Labor Relations and Law During World War II looks at the pledge through the
view of the government’s and corporations’ role and response to the wildcat strikes23. It is worth
noting that while these strikes provoked an outpouring of public outcry against workers and their
unions, virtually all of these historiographic works agree that these strikes had a minimal impact
on the production quotas of the American wartime economy.
There has, however, been little work on public debate about the strikes. Although all the
secondary sources mention public hostility to strikers, it is a significant issue that deserves
further analysis. This thesis will explore these events in three chapters. Chapter 2 will survey
why these wildcat strikes were occurring. It will analyze the stated causes of the strikers and the
different contributors of the conflict. The opportunism of lower-level management at the
apparent disappearance of strikes, the profiteering of corporations, and the overburdened
government committees that were tasked with addressing workers’ grievances to avoid strikes
will all be explored in detail. Furthermore, the never implemented “equality of sacrifice”
campaign, which was championed by labor to link raising wages with raising inflation, will be
interpreted as a prominent engine of worker discontent.24 This well-spring of frustration
stemmed from the popular sentiment that workers were sacrificing more than their wealthy
employers, who were called upon to forsake their wartime profits. Finally, the role that racism
played in strikes will be considered. Were hate strikes, or racially motivated disruptions in work,
a symptom of a seething and harried working class or were they part of a larger pattern of racism
and ethnic division in American labor history? This chapter will rely heavily on the secondary
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sources that were listed above as well as from Congressional investigations in which workers
were interviewed.
Chapter 3 will be the central focus of the thesis. After examining the background of the
strikes in the previous chapter, the public debate surrounding the wildcat strikes and workingclass intransigence will be examined thoroughly. The debate over what to do with strikers had
many sides to it – angry citizens and patriots, a befuddled government, workers who felt that
they were not being heard, a mass media, that choked with patriotic indignation, soldiers who felt
let down, union leaders who felt their influence wane, and the businesses and industries who
wanted to claim both patriotic honors and excessive profits. This thesis will also measure how
much the demands and complaints of workers factored into the public debate or received equal
treatment in the eyes of Americans. Was the invective language used against workers also
applied to businesses or the government? How did American attitudes change towards the
working class during the five years of war? How did Americans view the individual rights of
workers and the ideals of democracy against the realities and demands of the second world war?
These are some of the themes that will be examined as biproducts of this lively debate. The
sources used will come from hundreds of newspaper articles, editorials, letters to the editor from
citizens and soldiers, strikers’ pamphlets, and comics gathered to personify the public debate
surrounding the wildcat strikes.
Chapter 4 of this thesis will revolve around the passage of the Smith-Connally Act, which
placed restrictions on strikes and union activity. The focus will be on how the American public
reacted to the effectiveness of the law and their shifting moods towards labor as wildcat strikes
continued to rage and workers’ demands became more bitter. This chapter will illuminate the
public view of the Roosevelt Administration’s ability to deal with strikes and the further souring
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of opinion of the public on the labor movement. The sources involved in this chapter will be
excerpts from the Smith-Connally Act, debates in the Congressional Record, and a number of
newspapers chronicling the American attitudes and debate towards the law.
The voices of the media, the general public, workers, the government and soldiers on the
issue of wartime strikes can be found in the voluminous newspaper articles, editorials, and letters
to the editor from 1941-1945. Contemporary periodicals and digitized newspaper databases
provide access to a wide range of opinions that wrestled with this issue as do Congressional
hearings. Of the sources that were consulted, automobile industry workers during the war
received the most attention due to their militance. As a result of this industry’s domination by
CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations) labor unions, the CIO garners more attention than
their counterparts in the AFL (American Federation of Labor). This also was due to the fact that
the CIO official newspaper were prolific publishers during the war while the American
Federationist (periodical of the AFL) was only published once a month. Furthermore, workers’
voices were pulled from a wide array of places. Capturing working class moods and opinions is
difficult due to various contradictory social factors and since quotes from workers are rare.
This thesis has the potential to fill the void of the public debate surrounding the wildcat
strikes and ratification of the Smith-Connally Act during the Second World War. This helps add
continuity to the historiography of the 20th century. It also serves to examine how the popular
media’s portrayal of labor unions as disloyal and subversive elements drove public opinion
towards the consideration of more radical solutions to labor strikes. This galvanized public
opinion was also a result of public opinion polls, which are hypothesized to be used to convey a
false front of support for anti-strike legislation through biased polling and loaded questions.

9

Chapter 2: The Price of Civilization
The year 1941 found the American labor movement in a militant mood. The previous
decade unraveled the reverie of a united labor and management through Welfare Capitalism. The
Great Depression savaged the working class to the point where over twelve million workers or
about one out of four workers were struggling to overcome unemployment.1 The disillusionment
that Americans felt after the post-World War I optimism was aptly characterized by a
Communist Party workmen’s song. “I fought in the war for my country, I went out to bleed and
die. I thought that my country would help me, but this was my country’s reply: soup, soup. They
gave me a bowl of soup.”2 This caustic portrayal of the bread lines and soup kitchens that were
common during this time fed into a resurgence of unionist recruitment and activity. The sit-down
strike wave of 1937 and stalwart solidarity shown by the wives of workers forced some of the
most powerful corporations in America, most notably General Motors and U.S. Steel, to bow to
workers’ demands for union recognition.3 However, a rising strike-wave in 1941, due to the
chaos of re-armament and mobilization for war, the Japanese strike on Pearl Harbor on
December 7, 1941 and the American entrance into the war on the next day changed the situation
of labor because the stakes were significantly raised. This chapter will examine the No-Strike
Pledge, the Equality of Sacrifice campaign, and the causes of the ensuing wildcat strikes carried
out by galvanized workers.
Labor’s response to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was swift and fervent. Ongoing
strikes in military manufacturing plants in places such as Ravenna, Ohio and Morgantown, West
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Virginia were called off in lieu of the changing international situation.4 Union meetings were
called to decide how to best aid the war effort. One meeting of the New Jersey Congress of
Industrial Organizations (CIO) on December 8 voted to make “every needed sacrifice of our
labor, our fortunes, and our lives to defeat this new menace.”5 On December 9, William Green,
the President of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), stated to his Executive Council,
“Labor knows its duty. It will do its duty, and more. No new laws are necessary to prevent
strikes. Labor will see to that.”6 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, eager to secure
cooperation between the government, labor, and industrial management, scheduled a meeting a
few days later. What emerged from this meeting was the No-Strike Pledge, which President
Roosevelt summarized as: “1. There shall be no strikes or lockouts. 2. All disputes shall be
settled by peaceful means. 3. The President shall set up a proper War Labor Board to handle
these disputes.”7 In order to avoid work stoppages of vital war materials, Roosevelt offered the
creation of an impartial mediator between capital and labor to arbitrate disputes peacefully. In
true New Deal “alphabet soup” fashion, the forerunner Nation Defense Mediation Board
(NDMB) of 1941 and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) of 1935 were created to
address grievances that workers submitted against their employers. Amid this No-Strike Pledge,
the question of who benefitted most from it begs to be answered.
The significance of this agreement was profound, as strikes were often the only leverage
that workers held against their employers. The conservative founder of the AFL, Samuel
Gompers, said in 1899, “unless they [unionists] occasionally strike, or have the power to strike,
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the [economic] improvements will all go to the employer and all the injuries to the employees.”8
As vital as strikes were to the power of unions, taking the No-Strike Pledge contained some
elements of a quid-pro quo understanding between labor and the government.9 Labor won a large
concession from the National War Labor Board (NWLB) in the form of maintenance-ofmembership contracts, which businesses loathed. These contracts determined that when a
business had a contract with a union, all newly hired workers were automatically union members
unless they expressly waived the right during the first fifteen days on the job.10 As a result, union
membership swelled during the war and offered more representative power in the resurgence of
labor. However, without their primary weapon of striking, the benefits of the No-Strike Pledge
favored big business to a great degree.
Another reward for not striking was the Equality of Sacrifice program, which assured that
labor’s sacrifice of their principle tool of redress would be reflected by industry. This program
included “a prohibition of war profits, a $25,000 ceiling on salaries, control of inflation,
rationing of necessities, and so on.”11 The prohibition of wartime profits and the salary ceiling
was designed to hamper industrial management and big business laughed. The mobilization
effort and the beginning of the war was a boon for large corporations since their compliance was
essential for war production. The auto industry, for example, was needed to re-tool their factories
to build military aircraft, tanks, and other heavy-duty war materials. However, they refused to
make this conversion until mid-1941 when “thousands of tons of critical materials and countless
man hours were wasted in the production of passenger cars. The automakers allowed the concern
8
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for the preservation of their industry and for profit to obscure their very vision upon which the
government was depending for the creation of production ‘materials’”12 for war. The auto
industry also blithely relied on and accepted government subsidies to contribute to the war effort.
“General Motors, for example, built nearly $900,000,000 worth of new plants between 1940 and
1944, almost of which were paid for by the government.”13 This was occurring before and during
the conversation of the suspension of wartime profits as part of the Equality of Sacrifice. Those
promises were not feasible due to the President’s conflict of interest with big business. “In
virtually all other aspects of wartime mobilization, the Roosevelt administration relied heavily on
corporate officials”14 to carry out the complex centralization across multiple industries.
Both presidents of the AFL and CIO bitterly complained about labors exclusion of
important wartime agencies such as the Office of War Mobilization and the War Manpower
Commission by big business.15 Despite President Roosevelt’s pleas for sacrifice during his
famous fireside chats, which many Americans took to heart, “corporate profits before taxes had
risen 329% over 1939 levels.16 The sense of exasperation among government officials towards
big business’s lukewarm response to the demands of mobilization was palpable. A bitter Henry
Stimson, the Secretary of War in 1940, observed in his diary that “if you are going to try to go to
war, prepare for war in a capitalist country, you have got to let business make money out of the
process, or business won’t work.”17At the same time, the earnings of the middle and working
classes were being sacrificed due to inflation increasing faster than wages. For example, In
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Canton, Ohio, between January, 1941 and April, 1943, the price of a peck of potatoes increased
by 256% and the cost of a dozen eggs increased by 56%.”18
A mobilization effort for participation in warfare is a disruptive event in the best of
situations. The massive reallocation of resources, economic centralization, and conscription of
military personnel often bears a reconstitution of the workforce as civilians don uniforms and
leave for deployment. America during 1940 and 1941 was not an exception to the disruptive
forces of mobilization. Many experienced workers and veteran unionists were drafted or joined
various branches of the military. The same loss of personnel to the military applied to factory
foremen and lower-level management who were skilled in navigating the shifting tide of
demands from their charges. What naturally followed was an influx of new workers due to the
demands of the war industry. New “war workers faced enormous problems in housing, child
care, transportation, and medical services”.19 This exponential growth and the problems that it
brought with it can be observed in the Detroit area where the work force increased from under
400,000 to 869,000, between 1940-1943.20 Similar population growth also occurred in the
shipbuilding cities of Mobile, Tampa, and Jacksonville and the aircraft manufacturing centers in
southern California. The lack of accommodations brought about “housing shortages, rising crime
rates, racial tensions, and other evidences of social pathology.”21
Among the deluge of humanity that flocked to the defense industrial centers were African
Americans and women workers. The percentage of women who worked in the civilian labor
force climbed from 25% to 36% between 1940-1945.22 Women were drawn into the industrial
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sector out of economic necessity. For some, it was a way to compensate for the separation of a
loved one, for others, it was a way to support themselves. “The sudden absence of sons and
husbands, the fear of the dreaded telegram from the Department of War, and the annoyances and
inconveniences of rationing, shortages, and disrupted family lives swept up even the most
traditional housewife into the great national crusade.”23
The infusion of women onto the factory floor forced many to re-evaluate their
preconceptions of gender roles. Women, who were supposed to be protected and delicate
creatures, were now working in laborious and dirty jobs that were considered to be man’s work.
This was bound to cause friction within the work-place because “of the fundamental
misconception that women were not permanent members of the labor force.”24 The novelty of
women in a male-dominated workplace gave rise to predictable problems. “Sexual harassment
from fellow employees and supervisors often worked to create an intimidating and hostile
atmosphere on the shop floor”25 for women. Substandard pay, the allocation of menial tasks,
discriminatory managerial practices that punished women for their out-of-work behavior, and
attire were the cold realities that women had to face.26 Furthermore, the existence of the doubleday presented a uniquely female problem. Typically, workers required an amount of respite at
home or at the bar after a long day on the shop floor. Women were denied this luxury by virtue
of their caregiving roles. The double-day entailed “waged labor coupled with primary
responsibility of household chores and child-raising. Largely because of these demands, which
often called them away from the factory for personal and family responsibilities, women workers
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found it harder than men to remain at one job.”27 The mountain of adversity that many female
workers faced made their short-term prospects appear sere and barren. However, women did not
face this dissension meekly. Social historian George Lipsitz described women responding to
male “wolf whistles by whistling back at the men and exchanging wisecracks.”28
Women looked to trade unions to help protect them from discriminatory practices, which
unions did inconsistently.29 When unions adopted the same paternalism that industrial
management did, women looked to themselves to find avenues of solidarity and mutual support.
One example of this creativity was noted at the Dodge plant in Hamtramck, Michigan. Women at
the factory would select one of their members to cover for their work for a time. This ‘restroom
matron’ “went downtown during working hours with a long shopping list and did the shopping
for the whole department”30 since they all were working 6-7 days a week.
Women were not the only new demographic that altered the workplace. African
Americans constituted a significant proportion of new workers that poured into the industrial
centers. Michigan, the heart of the automobile industry, saw an 87.4% increase in non-white
workers between 1940-1950.31 As a whole, black participation in manufacturing bloomed.
“Black employment in manufacturing, which in 1940 stood at levels considerably below predepression figures, grew by 150%. By the end of 1944, some 1,250,000 Negro workers, 300,000
of them female, toiled in manufacturing,”32 which centered around the steel, meatpacking, and
shipbuilding industries.
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Predictably, the pernicious legacy of racism loomed large over this influx of African
American workers. The long tradition of exclusion of black workers from skill-intensive jobs
was revived and redoubled. In September, 1941, North American Aviation, a large defense
contractor issued a statement that “the Negro will be considered only as janitors and other similar
capacities…regardless of their training, we will not employ them.”33 Other large businesses, such
as Ford, were able to use the increase of black workers to manipulate the existing racial tensions
between the workers as a way to avoid strikes and work stoppages. In the confused setting of the
factories, white and black workers were often intermingled on the assembly line. Occasionally,
white women and black men worked in the same space, which added heat to the explosive topic
of sexual stereotypes between black men and white women. This closeness of work conditions
ignited ugly confrontations between workers. One CIO representative in Memphis, Tennessee,
related a typical story of the tensions and violence that accompanied the inter-racial workplace.
“Firestone had to shut down three days last week after a guard and a Negro woman became
engaged in an altercation. During the exchange of words, the Negro called the guard a SOB [son
of a bitch], and the guard slugged her. The white folks walked out in protest over the firing of the
guard, and the Negros followed suit.”34
These tensions often boiled out from the shop floor to occur in the new over-crowded
community. Southern manufacturing centers in Texas and Alabama were especially prone to
violence. Fights broke out on the street cars and city busses between blacks and whites over
black efforts to vote in the all-white primary elections and the white fears of a ‘black uprising’ in
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the South.35 This was one in an epidemic of violent race riots in the summer of 1943, which
affected Detroit, New York, and Los Angeles.
The black worker’s response to this turmoil was principled and steadfast. At the outset of
the war, in the face of the exclusion by workers and businesses, A. Phillip Randolph, veteran
unionist, socialist, and president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters called for a march
on Washington D.C. What started as a moderate number of attendees swelled as local rallies and
grassroots activists coalesced around the promised March on Washington. Contained in
Randolph’s manifesto were expressions of stalwart anger and the straightforward demands of
change. “We loyal Negro American citizens demand the right to work…we must fight for it and
fight for it with gloves off.”36 President Roosevelt, anxious to avoid a public demonstration,
which numbered in the hundreds of thousands, buckled to Randolph’s demands for change and
established the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) to address grievances of
discrimination from black Americans in exchange for cancelling the March on Washington.
While the FEPC was commonly criticized by the black community as being toothless and
sluggish in its mediation, “neglecting ‘legitimate channels’ like appeals to representatives or
trade unions, black protestors took their grievances directly to the streets in an attempt to force a
response.”37
Emboldened black workers forced some labor organizations to take a stance on the issue
of race. The CIO was one of the main organizations to acknowledge the plight of black workers
and attempt to address the problems of racism with a fair level of consistency. “Many CIO
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activists, especially those associated with the CPUSA (American Communist Party), identified
strongly with the concerns of black Americans…civil rights and industrial unionism quickly
developed reciprocal relations, with the presence of the CIO often energizing somnolent civil
rights groups and with African Americans educating CIO representatives as to the close
relationship between civic and social discrimination and workplace injustice.”38
Further alliances between CIO subsidiaries and the NAACP (National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People) provided even more concrete ties and broke with the history of
racial exclusion by unions. While the realities of this alliance between the CIO, Communists, and
various civil rights groups was certainly met with opposition from rank and file workers, the CIO
leaders actively addressed the concerns of their African American workers. The CIO proclaimed
itself as “a people’s movement… It does not ask questions of race or color or creed or
origin…The CIO welcomes you.”39 The AFL, the chief rival labor conglomerate of the CIO,
avoided the progressive stance on racism. The AFL had a reputation for the conservatism of its
leadership and members. Their lack of protection of African American members was evident in
their 1941 national convention. The Executive Board stated, “the AFL did not discriminate, that
discrimination as it existed could not be altered as ‘human nature could not be altered,’ and that
African Americans ought to be ‘grateful’ for what the Federation had done for them.”40 As such,
African Americans who experienced difficulties from their fellow union members, racist coworkers, and discriminatory managerial policies were on their own. These conflicts took place
within the larger context of a wildcat strike wave that rippled through the workforce during the
Second World War.
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American public opinion, which will be examined in the next chapter, generally
expressed incredulity at why these strikes were occurring. To many relatives of soldiers and
armchair patriots, to strike during such a national crisis was selfish at best and treasonous at
worst. However, to workers, their reasons were manifold and legitimate. A report presented to
the Senate by George Romney of the Automobile Manufacturers Association on 108 case study
strikes between December 1944 and February 1945. This analysis concluded that “the presumed
causes of these often brief stoppages reveals reactions to various kinds of discipline (40 cases)
and protests over working conditions, job assignments and orders, and hours of work (40
cases).”41 Rosa Lee Swafford’s study for the Automotive Council for War Production arrived at
a similar conclusion that “most of the strikes were protests against discipline, protests over
certain company policies, or protest against the discharge of one or several employees”42 There
was, however, some discrepancy between different statistical studies that took place during the
war. Several studies done by Monthly Labor Review during 1943 and 1944 attributed the
majority of causes of strikes to wage disputes (43.3-51%) with job security (12.3-16%) playing a
minor but not insignificant role.4344 These two studies reported that disputes over shop conditions
and policies at only 13.3% in 1943 and 16.1% in 1944 of all strikes that year.45 This could be due
to unique conditions in various industries. The automotive and mining industries, for example,
were markedly more militant than other fields. This study will focus on the phenomenon of
managerial abuse, working conditions, and racially motivated “hate strikes” which played a
significant role in the agitation of already inflamed workers.
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Managerial Mismanagement
It is important to note that many of the irritants that defense industry workers experienced
did not happen in a vacuum. Fatigue and long hours wore down workers like a millstone around
their necks. Marc Scott Miller conducted a study of wartime Lowell, Massachusetts and found
that many workers had two jobs and worked sixty-hour work weeks.46 Still others spent their offduty hours on civil defense volunteer forces making sure that the air raid blackouts were
enforced.47 Donald Krinkie, an iron foundry worker who built amphibious assault vehicles for
the Oliver Corporation, admitted to working a staggering amount during the heat of the war.
“Well, we worked a lot of hours then. I averaged 72 and a half hours a week for 52 weeks one
year.”48 Working approximately 10-12 hours a day in the sweltering foundry doing hard labor
was excruciatingly exhausting. When factoring in fatigue and exhaustion, the following
managerial policies aggravated to many workers who often turned to striking as a recourse.
With labor’s bargaining chip of the strike officially disappearing with the No Strike
Pledge, industrial managers and corporate employers sat up and took notice. It was the perfect
opportunity to win back some of the powers that the tidal wave of labor militancy of the 1930’s
washed away. The power to fire workers capriciously and without regard to their seniority status
at the workplace was especially coveted.49 Workers chafed under the strict disciplinary measures
that were installed to punish even minor infractions of shop floor rules. One unionized worker in
the Chevrolet Flint local recalled that his managers meticulously kept tallies of infractions in
order to fire troublesome or militant workers. “They thought they were disciplining the workers
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at the time and they thought they had a chance to do it on account of the war. We have the
umpire system at General Motors and you have to build a record against the man before you can
take it to the umpire50 and actually discharge him. So they tried to build a record against
everyone…”51
Sometimes, surveillance of employees could take a sinister turn. Worker’s behavior in the
factory and towards management had consequences that extended beyond the workplace. The
UAW convention in 1943 discussed collusion between business and industrial interests and the
draft boards. They charged that “management has used the draft for discriminatory purposes
against active union members, has shown favoritism in protecting from the draft, workers less
than others being inducted.”52 Militant workers then could be singled out and drafted into the
armed forced and be thrown into the maw of the war. On the other hand, an employer’s favorite
worker could receive a deferment from military service which would virtually guarantee an
exclusion from the war. Clarence Ramsey, a packinghouse worker for Armour & Co., recalled
experiencing this favoritism firsthand. “At that time I was president of the union. And [the plant
supervisor] threw these papers to me. He says, ‘Here, Clarence, sign it.’ I said, ‘I don’t sign
nothing until I read it, Harry. You know that.’ ‘Well,’ he says, ‘I know that.’ So I read this thing,
and it was me asking for a deferment due to my family and the job.”53
This control of personal behavior extended to the uneven distribution of privileges within
the workplace. The right to smoke in the workplace was revoked in some cases and had to be
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won back through striking. Jack Palmer recalled attempting to negotiate with his managers
during the war over this issue. “I said we would go in and bargain on a grievance for a person
being sent home for smoking. They sat there and smoked and they would not let us smoke in the
same office.”54 Palmer and workers like him were not the only ones who took note of industrial
management’s wartime intransigence. In January of 1943, a War Production Board member
reported to Washington that “The evidence which is piling up seems to indicate rather clearly
that a well-organized and determined effort is being made on the part of many manufacturers and
industrialists to do everything in their power to create instances which will ‘needle’ and provoke
labor into unauthorized stoppage of work.”55 The reasoning for this, as will be examined in the
next chapter, was the public relations nightmare that wildcat strikes caused for labor. Especially
for the many on the home front who had loved ones in the military, strikes meant a vicious
public outrage and an eventual drafting of anti-strike legislation from Congress.
Workers who sought to appeal to the War Labor Board (WLB) for mediation were often
frustrated by the over-worked agency and the management who took advantage of the glacial
speed of redress. Jess Ferrazza, a local union president during the war, described in an interview
management’s preference for mediation. “Management would not settle grievances, they would
tell us to take them to the War Labor Board. The result was that grievances took a year or year
and a half to process. Many of the workers thought this was the long course around. The result
was many unauthorized work-stoppages.”56 The umpire that the worker at General Motors
discussed, presumably the WLB, often did not receive the majority of grievances that workers
filed. According to labor historian, Nelson Lichtenstein, “more than one hundred thousand
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grievances were filed annually at GM (General Motors), and approximately one thousand
reached the umpire.”57
When the strikes began to spread later in the war as a result of this pent-up anger, labor
leaders were also scorned by workers who associated them with big business and the No-Strike
Pledge. Past a certain threshold, “The dam broke…strikers simply ignored labor leaders.”58
Union leaders, caught between the roles of enforcing the No-Strike Pledge for big business and
trying to placate the strikes that were caused by the actions of management, found themselves
met it increasingly hostility from their charges. Some union representatives were shouted down
and cat-called when they addressed crowds of angry workers.59
Working Conditions
With fatigue setting in and facing the capricious hostility that was shown by many
managers, working conditions were another irritant which contributed to the flair-up of wartime
strikes. Working in a factory during the feverish production levels of the war was difficult in the
best of times. Workers often dealt with rough working conditions, which made their work much
more grueling. Evelyn Gates, a worker at Firestone’s rubber plants, remembered the hazardous
conditions due to poor ventilation in her retirement decades later. “It was lots hotter inside the
plant than outside, because of all the steam from the pipes. So, if it was ninety degrees outside, it
would be maybe ten degrees hotter in the plant, and you’d be wringing wet. There was one fan
on the end of the line, and that was it. People would get sick and fall out from the heat.”60
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Some of these problems may be attributed to the rapid expansion of defense industries
that sometimes resembled the frenetic industrialization of the Stalinist Five-Year Plans.
Journalist Mary Heaton Vorse, in her study and interviews of industrial workers during 1942,
attributed hazardous conditions to much of the labor unrest. “Unnecessary fumes, overheating,
poor ventilation are common. From Wisconsin a social worker writes ‘I am rather nonplussed at
the rubber factory conditions. The fumes are terrific, and there is a constant turnover because of
illness; yet the girls want to work there to provide the raincoats, because the soldiers need
them.’”61 When shop conditions deteriorate and workers are driven ever onward by the lash of
production quotas, accidents were bound to happen.
Industrial work was not a safe vocation to pursue. Working quickly around machines that
could maim or kill an unobservant or harried employee guaranteed that gruesome accidents were
inevitable. The entry of many new and inexperienced workers into the factories added another
interlocking danger as amateurism and ignorance could be fatal. During the rush for
mobilization in 1940 and the increasing industrial frenzy to support American soldiers, many
popular magazines expressed worry on the safety of defense workers. The pro-business outlet
Fortune commented during July of 1942 that “when Management takes the overzealous view
that production must be achieved at all costs – accidents are in the making.”62 A few months
earlier, Popular Mechanics magazine warned that workers were “dying by the thousands, being
maimed and disabled by more thousands, in a “blitzkrieg” led by General Carelessness.”63 The
figures that Popular Mechanics proffered were understatements of the sad truth behind the
unsafe working conditions. In 1941, the number of industrial accidents which resulted in injuries
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reported were 2,180,200 with 19,200 workers dead.64 With the war going poorly for the allies in
1942 with Nazi Germany and Japan dominating large swaths of the globe, the accident rate rose
to a staggering with 2,267,700 disabling injuries and 19,900 deaths.65 The result of the common
experience of witnessing horrific injuries and deaths was the disaffection and lowered morale of
industrial workers in the war. These staggering casualty figures undoubtedly would have made a
mockery of the idea of the Equality of Sacrifice. Even in the later stages of the war with
American soldiers dying on the shores of Europe and the Pacific Islands, civilian casualties were
still comparable. A pamphlet that was displayed in the International Harvester Corporation’s
Tractor Works poignantly illustrated this point below. It was small wonder that resentment over
employer intransigence coupled with appalling casualties would generate unrest and labor
stoppages. One more factor added a dynamic volatility to the boiling cauldron of discontent:
race.
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Hate Strikes
George Galloway, an African American railroad worker and member of the Brotherhood
of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP), recalled an incident on his way home from work that typified
racial relations in America for him. While working on a Pullman train transporting German
prisoners of war, he saw something that he remembered for decades afterwards. “We stopped in
Little Rock, Arkansas, that morning, and they fed the German prisoners in that beautiful crystal
dining room. The put the six Pullman porters in the kitchen. I was one of them. It came out in the
newspapers all over, about the prisoners being served in the crystal dining room, and the black
porters being served in the kitchen…’The Germans are white, aren’t they?’”67 The demands of
the defense industry were colorblind but those who worked inside the factory walls were not.
The demands of total war placed southern rural whites and northern urban blacks, black men and
white women in the same room and sometimes even side-by-side on the line. Old racial
prejudices that were previously nursed at a distance now surfaced in the very close proximity of
one’s co-workers, at times resulting in clashes between over-worked and agitated workers.
Hate strikes were called by white workers and often provoked counter-strikes by their
black co-workers. Black workers early in the war often staged wild cat strikes to protest the
under-utilization of their skills. White workers jealously guarded high-paid skill-intensive jobs in
industry. After black workers agitated for the right to enter the skill intensive job pool in 1941,
“Packard officials reluctantly agreed to upgrade their black employees. But personnel officers
warned blacks that bloodshed might ensue if they accepted transfers to higher-paying defense
jobs.”68 Later, in 1943, after 4 black women were upgraded to skilled work “immediately 2,300
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workers walked off the job, and another 700 joined them in a few days to protest the transfers”69
Packard supervisors who had a strong interest in exploiting the fissures within the shop floor
deftly exploited this rift. Company managers sought to associate the racialized and heated
workplace with unions. Packard employers told “white workers that they could, and should, defy
their union and refuse to work with blacks.”70 Hate strikes over the promotions of black workers
was a reoccurring theme across multiple industries. Large strikes in 1943 spread across the
nation like a bloodstain as Mobile’s dry docks and shipbuilding installations, Sparrow’s Point
shipyards in Baltimore, Bethlehem Steel mills, Aliquippa, Point Breeze Western Electrical plants
stopped work due to protests over the promotion of black workers or demands for segregated
facilities.71
Some of these racialized work stoppages had a violent and brutal dimension. One
infamous example was recounted by Irene Bench, a Firestone worker: “I remember a black
woman was beat up right at the bus stop outside of the plant, around 1944. A supervisor hit her,
and the blacks walked out of the plant. Blacks had a hard time, they’d beat you up anytime. A
white supervisor would hit a black. I didn’t get hit, but several other blacks did, mens and
womens.”72 Indignities such as this one are in a long and sordid line of violent episodes that were
perpetrated against blacks. The shipyards in Beaumont, Texas during the strike wave of spring
1943 were especially pernicious scenes of racialized malevolence. After black workers won the
right to work in high-paying and skilled jobs, they were greeted by white co-workers by getting
molten rivets mysteriously dropped on them.73 This took place during a general increase in racial
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tensions in the benighted city due to the desegregated work place and the changing social
relations in the country brought by wartime migrations of working class Americans. One muggy
evening on June 15, 1943, over two thousand workers staged a wildcat strike so they could lynch
a black man who was accused of raping a white woman.74 Fabricated accusations of interracial
sex and the rape of white women invariably worked as lightning rods for racial tensions to erupt
into violence. That summer night in Beaumont was no different, as a mob shouted “Let’s go to
n****r town!” which kicked off a night of vandalization and terrorizing of various black
neighborhoods.75 This riot occurred days after the famous Zoot Suit Riots in Los Angeles and
shortly before the race riots of Detroit and New York City which were only quelled by federal
soldiers. When viewed against the backdrop of proliferating acts of violence, the wildcat strikes
caused by racism had political significance. While propaganda of a strong and united home front
was undermined by such events, it gave black Americans a chance to project their dissent. “They
understood that a power structure that obscured real conflicts through false claims of consensus
made itself vulnerable to even a small group of demonstrators because their actions shatter the
illusion of unanimity.”76 These wildcat strikes were demands of respect and redress melded with
a broader movement to secure equal footing in 20th century America.
The success of the wildcat strikes was mixed. In some cases, the WLB ruled on the side
of workers and granted them concessions and better working conditions. Other wildcat strikes,
such as the famous North American Aviation strike in 1941 or the Philadelphia Transit Strike of
1944 were crushed by military personnel, who sometimes acted as strike-breakers in where
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defense was concerned. Regardless of the mixed outcomes of wildcat strikes, the reputation of
workers and labor unions was severely tarnished in the eyes of the mass media and the public.

30

Chapter 3: The Debate
The wildcat strike wave during World War II caused a great deal of consternation among
different sectors in the American public. The numerous causes of these labor disputes seemed to
be lost in the popular rebuke and righteous indignation against labor unions and wartime
workers. What replaced the nuances was a concern over how these strikes would affect the
course of the war, framing their reactions within the confines of wartime patriotism, and what
constitutes the proper amount of sacrifice to contribute towards winning the war. Various
stakeholders’ views and opinions of the wildcat strikes will be analyzed in this chapter. The
vituperative nature of this debate was due to a mutual lack of understanding of the No-Strike
Pledge and the economic well-being of the working class.
“Don’t They Know A War Is Going On?”
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The condemnation by soldiers of the strikes that were occurring on the home front were
among the most acidic rebukes of labor and workers during World War II. These admonitions
were gleefully published in newspapers due to the strong support that soldiers commanded with
the US public during war time. They were the ones who decided to sacrifice the most by placing
themselves in the cauldron of war to liberate a continent and roll back the rising tide of Axis
aggression. The virtuousness and selflessness of soldiers was often mentioned to draw a
comparison between themselves and the workers who were falling short of the requisite virtue
and sacrifice that wartime demands. J.E. Real of Pittsburgh PA quoted an interview with soldiers
about their experiences overseas: “Our worries are not all the great danger we are in…a lot of us
will never be coming home.”78 Arguments posed in the face of the sobering realities of the
ravages of war seem to fall short. Four non-commissioned officers wrote the Pittsburgh Press
that “they [strikers] value money more than a soldier’s sweat and blood.”79 This lack of
perspective of strikers seemed to be a common thread of discontent in the writings of soldiers.
Private First-Class Charlotte Peterseil mused to her father that “these men are making more
money than they’ve ever made in their lives,”80 while soldiers are not privy to raises in the
Army. This bitterness sometimes verged on the conspiratorial. “The way it looks they want to
make the war last as long as it can go so they can continue to make those good wages.”81
Ironically, this opinion was conveyed to American soldiers by German counterintelligence and propaganda efforts during the operations in North Africa. The New York Times
wrote that “troops from the front who know how enemy propaganda operates and are sensitive to

78

“Soldiers Opinion of Homefront Quoted” Pittsburgh Press (Pittsburgh, PA), Jan. 14, 1944,16.
“Soldiers Would Trade Places With Strikers,” Pittsburgh Press (Pittsburgh, PA), Jan. 8, 1944, 4.
80
“Pittsburgh WAC Condemns Strikes,” Pittsburgh Press (Pittsburgh, PA), Jan. 14, 1944, 4.
81
“Soldiers on Strikes,” The Indianapolis Star (Indianapolis, Indiana), Jan. 22, 1944, 10.
79

32

it said that German radio stations ‘tell us every night that Lewis and his crowd want to prolong
the war to fill their jeans.”82 This propaganda wrought from an inquisitive German counterintelligence team identified strikes as a way to demoralize American soldiers and make them feel
expendable in a fight that was not taken seriously on the home front. Strikes were among the list
of topics that could invariably darken the moods and fighting spirits of the soldiers. A corporal
from the Signal Corps admitted that “the most discouraging thing we all discuss here is the home
situation – war workers striking, absenteeism, and complaints about rationing.”83 All of these
complaints could be directly linked to the labor unions’ lack of control over their workers and the
perception of the mood of the workers. This demoralization was palpable enough that President
Roosevelt reportedly was concerned about the severity of the psychological impact that the
wildcat strikes had on soldiers.84 This exasperation and deflated morale is palpable in Corporal.
J.W. Monroe’s plea to strikers written shortly before the Allied aerial and amphibious assault of
Normandy. “That’s what takes the morale out of a fighting man. If we are fighting for you, will
you please give us something to fight with?”85 Risking one’s life for a noble cause while feeling
that this sacrifice is not appreciated, taken for granted, and even desecrated weighed heavily on
the minds of soldiers.
In the eyes of the men and women who were fighting, these strikes seemed like a betrayal
of the highest caliber from workers who were supposed to be supporting them with the weapons
of warfare and life-sustaining supplies. To go on strike would be “the same kind of treason…for
General Eisenhower and the men under him to throw down their arms now.”86 Soldiers did not
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have the luxury to go on strike to address perennial complaints due to the duty and weight of
obligation that bound them. Furthermore, strikers possessed privileges they were unaware of,
privileges that soldiers acutely noticed due to their absence. James Blankenship bitterly stated
from the frontline that “strikers back home have a nice, warm bed and good food. They can go to
a movie and also get a glass of beer.”87 The life of a soldier was often spent outdoors in foxholes,
tents, and trenches while at the mercy of the elements. Instead of a warm bed, soldiers during the
1944 Battle of the Bulge slept in snowy frozen earthen shelters without food that could be
appraised as either good or hot. Soldiers in the North African campaign wished that strikers
could experience the hardships unique to the geography. “Let’s put the strikers in the desert, let
them be the soldiers we are, in heat that hits 130 degrees. After a few weeks, they would be glad
to go back to work.”88 Soldiers also noticed another absence which strikers did not – loved ones.
Staff Sargent Edward Ditchjus, a union member, seethed that “strikes won’t help me and my
buddies get back to our wives and families.”89 The contrast between the soldier stoically
enduring hardships and workers who complained about working conditions on the home front
paint a profoundly unfavorable impression of the toughness and resolve of laborers.
The condemnation of soldiers extended beyond the chidings of a lack of toughness;
strikers often had dire accusations leveled at them. Work stoppages in the war industries was
often interpreted by soldiers as tantamount to murder. In the midst of the allied liberation in Italy
in 1944, Captain Judson Williams wrote that “One member of the team refuses to move forward
– the other cannot. That means lost time and lost time now is lost lives.”90 Pfc. Peterseil opined
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more strongly “It’s a disgrace, and we’re ashamed of what’s going on. It’s sabotage and it’s
murder.”91 Soldiers who expressed such views placed American workers who went on strike in a
similar category with Axis soldiers in their degree of harmfulness to Allied soldiers. Stationed in
the Pacific theater in 1944 on the eve of Operations Reckless and Persecution to invade New
Guinea, Cpl. Robert Tatum drew a similar conclusion. “I think that any man who goes on strike
during wartime is just as much or more our enemy as Germany and Japan.”92 This categorization
placed workers on par with the anti-German and racialized anti-Japanese wartime propaganda
that would have been familiar to most Americans. Workers and labor unions were backed into a
rhetorical corner to draw a line between themselves and the Axis. Sargent Robert S. Frankenburg
quipped that “Labor shows poor common sense and the lack of judgement when it pulls off
strikes in times of war. Soldiers get a firing squad for similar actions.”93
This insinuation of treason was often repeated among the letters of soldiers who
mentioned the wildcat strikes in newspaper articles and letters to the editor. A leader of the
American Legion, a veteran organization, was quoted telling William Green, the president of the
American Federation of Labor (AFL), that “if it is treason for a man to refuse to use his gun on
the front, then, too, it should be treason for a person to refuse to work on the home front – to do
the things that keep a soldier from getting that gun.”94 These accusations delivered to the
American public backed by the ethos of military personnel during wartime had the potential to
influence the home front’s opinion of how strikes were to be treated. Among the extreme rhetoric
generated by embittered soldiers arose the label of strikers as unpatriotic and un-American, a
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serious accusation during wartime. A group of soldiers who were deployed a week before the DDay operation of 1944 wrote to the Evening Star addressing patriotic citizens and stating that
they did not “consider these types (strikers) to be real Americans. They are leeches who use the
sacrifices of real Americans.”95
In the midst of the outrage of soldiers, there were various opinions (mostly published in
military newspapers) that did not participate in the popular anger against labor and rejected
notions about the disloyalty and un-Americanism of wartime workers. Since many of veteran
unionists such as Lieutenant M.R.L. were among the first to be drafted, the armed forces had a
considerable numbers of sympathetic personnel.96 Pfc. Sid Bard wrote from the front in France
that “as a soldier, I am even more contemptuous of those who point to strikes and loudly
proclaim that labor is losing the war.”97 The common consensus among these dissidents was that
the impact of strikes were greatly overblown by a media that had never been friendly to labor.
Sargent M. Chaves claimed that “only one-tenth of one percent of total time available was lost to
strikes. That is a record that American labor can be proud of.”98
Charges of mainstream media dishonesty was a common theme among sympathetic
soldiers, some of whom used to be members of labor organizations. “Why the hell do they play
up, to gigantic proportions, these labor strikes and unrest, when in reality they are of small
proportions?”99 Other military periodicals claimed that the anger that soldiers felt was easily
stoked by their separation from the home front and the events that they were hearing about. “But
this attitude leaves them open to stories about how much money the workers back home are
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making, how many women they’ve got, and how soft a life they have. It’s the easiest thing in the
world to put these ideas over, especially since a man overseas usually does not have access to all
the facts.”100 Opinions such as these did not attempt to explain away the fact that strikes
occurred, but rather call attention to the fact that soldiers were more envious of what workers had
and what soldiers lacked. Among soldiers who abstained from criticism, many of them praised
the quality of the work that labor consistently produced and challenged the conception of
laborers as lacking toughness and manhood that was suggested by some of their comrades. “Who
do you think made this stuff – pixies?”101
Some soldiers opposed the popular admonition of strikers and workers on political
principles. At the beginning of the American involvement in the war, many veteran unionists
were drafted or joined the armed forces and carried their views with them. Lt. M.R.L wrote from
Luxemburg in the final days of the war that “many men fighting here now, such as myself, have
fought and worked as civilians to bring some economic security, a just return for a day’s work,
collective bargaining” and blamed not the worker but those who worked in business and
industrial management.102 As previously mentioned, the excessive profits that were reaped in the
war industries were chronicled but only half-heartedly criticized by the media. Soldiers
sometimes criticized the excessive profiteering of industrial corporations such as Ford or Dodge.
Technician Fourth Grade Paul Barton Johnson viewed “uncontrolled monopolistic private
enterprise” as the largest threat to democracy, not uncontrolled unionism and disorderly
workers.103 While some soldiers, whether due to their insights fighting in a war which was
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supposed to defend democracy or their union backgrounds, sympathized with workers, the public
was less sympathetic
“Look Here, Mr. Striker”

104

While a vocal majority of soldiers that expressed their opinions which ranged from
strikers as weak willed to strikers deserving a traitor’s bullet, the American public’s opinion
appeared to more strongly oppose the wildcat strikes. The reasons for this are manifold. Many of
these angry citizens had a personal stake through relatives or loved ones who were in the armed
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forces and fighting in the war. A strike in the war industries seemed to directly threaten loved
ones in the military, especially since newspaper articles often discussed the shortage of supplies
that wildcat strikes could cause. Other Americans undoubtedly opposed the wartime strikes out
of a sense of patriotism. The Allied forces were engaged in a titanic struggle against Fascism,
militarism, and Axis aggression. The idea of liberal democracy - the system which sought to
preserve individual rights through a representative government - was challenged by countries
such as Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union, and Japan who sought to create a new political system
through conquest. It would then seem unconscionable to oppose and hinder the American war
effort which raised suspicions of fifth-column activity and un-Americanism.
In early 1941, during the mobilization and defense increase in industry, the American
public blamed the proliferating strike wave on Communist agitators. They seemed to be a likely
suspect after signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact which guaranteed non-aggression and closer
economic ties between Nazi controlled Germany and the Soviet Union. Communist rhetoric
swiveled from lampooning fascist aggression and seeking a popular front to opposing the further
spread of fascism to criticizing the west for antagonizing the Third Reich in hopes of igniting an
imperialist war to increase profits. While Communists did note the increasing profits of the
defense industry and were involved in strikes, the American public viewed them as “enemies
within.”105 “Nazism has been curbed but Bolshevists are still permitted to order strikes propagate
all kinds of lies to retard defense measures,” claimed W.W. Miller of Shattuck, Oklahoma about
a month before the American entrance into World War II.106 Miller, among other Americans,
saw communism as a subversive threat that was drowned out by Hitler’s iniquities in Poland and
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Yugoslavia. After a war of annihilation placed the Soviet Union in German crosshairs,
Communists became some of the stoutest defenders of the No-Strike Pledge.
Public blame shifted away from Communist agitators and towards unions and the
nebulous idea of the labor racketeer.107 Unions were often blamed for the wildcat strikes despite
their best efforts to control their workers. The charge that unions cared more about themselves
and less about the collective sacrifice that the war required was not uncommon. Albert Kelly of
Reno, Nevada claimed that “When labor waves a flag and shouts ‘the union forever,’ it means
not American, but the labor union…Labor used to mean those who work, now it means those
who strike.”108 Wildcat strikers were also accused of orchestrating a “strike against the American
people” which emphasized their otherness and could place strikers on the side of the Axis since
they too were on the opposing side of the Americans during the war.109 Labor, by allowing
strikes to continue despite the No-Strike Pledge, allowed “the will of the American people be
defied” and courted anarchy and chaos.110 This criticism of the CIO’s United Rubber Workers
strike in Akron, Ohio during 1943 also warned that labor’s decision to defy the wartime labor
mediation board ran the risk of labor “becoming a law of its own,” which rhetorically placed
labor on the opposite side of law-abiding citizens and the democratic tradition of heeding public
opinion which was an indefensible position in a war that many Americans interpreted as against
autocracy and militarism.111
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The accusation of divided loyalties and a want of money was also commonly voiced by
angry Americans. Oliver Eearle sarcastically wrote from Binghamton, New York during 1942
“Let’s strike right now and get ours, and the devil take the hindmost – our desperately hardpressed warriors. Is it our country we are defending or our own individual aggrandizement?”112
Earle continued, “Take a look at our sons [and theirs] who are fighting on distant battlefields and
sinking ships at the munificent wage of 21$ or thereabouts a month. They cannot strike for
higher wages, shorter hours, nor can they dictate their working conditions.” 113 This want of
money has an implication of workers lack the willingness to answer the call to endure hardship
and make sacrifices for the sake of the war effort. “While our boys are fighting and dying over
there, while everyone else is suffering and undergoing hardships and taking cuts, labor is not
only not taking less than its luxury wage, but howling for more.”114 According to Albert Kelly of
Reno, Nevada, labor had grown too accustomed to their overinflated wages and could not handle
the necessary sacrifices of warfare. Disputing over prices and haggling for more would
undoubtedly appear to many onlookers of the strikes that the worker, oblivious to the stakes, was
“throwing down his tools and crying for 25 or 30 cents more an hour.”115 The image of war
industry workers crying and throwing a tantrum like a toddler did not help improve their esteem
in the eyes of the public.
Accusations of worker ingratitude and lack of perspective became insistent as the strikes
persisted. “Thank God that most of us realize after all that we are very fortunate, in spite of our
problems. So, go on back to your jobs and quit whining. Just thank God that you are not slaving
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for the Nazis with a beastly Gestapo watching your every move.”116 Americans pointed out that
those on strike were not the only ones suffering on the home-front. Rationing and price inflation
made the lives of many Americans difficult. However, those who were against the wildcat
strikers saw that the alternative of living under a fascist regime under political surveillance was
much graver than the loss of wages or weakened working conditions. After all, if the war was
lost, the Axis victors would not highly value American working conditions and higher standard
of wages. If striking lost the war, workers might lose the rights that they were striking for.
The sympathy for soldiers and acknowledgment of the danger that soldiers were placing
themselves in was often mentioned in statements of public opinion against strikers. The lack of
complaint from soldiers about their wages was compared to the demands of increased wages
from workers who were safe at home.
Ideas about what should be done to the wildcat strikers were far ranging and in some
cases extreme. The public often seemed at a loss for how to address and solve the problems and
prevent the strikes in the future. For some, acknowledging the strikers’ demands as legitimate
was naturally out of the question due to the negative impact on the war effort and lack of
patriotism that these labor disputes demonstrated to many Americans. If mediation did not work,
extreme measures were often called for. In response to a 1941 transit strike in Philadelphia, WM
Curtis opined that “Canada has the right idea in dealing with those who try to call strikes against
defense industries by putting them in concentration camps for the duration. More power to
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her.”117 This method of detaining strikers into mass prisons was not new, and used during World
War One in the copper fields of Bisbee, Arizona.118
Many Americans viewed drafting strikers as a more palatable and effective way to curb
the rising tide of wildcat strikes. In Cleo Pierce’s letter to the Daily Oklahoman titled “Draft or
Beg,?” she wrestled with the issue that even getting down on her knees and begging “please, Mr.
Lewis, will you call off the strike and let the men go back to defense work?” would not solve
anything and that more severe actions are needed since there was a war on the horizon.119 Four
days after Mrs. Pierce’s angry letter, a national poll was published in the New York Times which
revealed that 76% of interviewed Americans favored drafting strikers into the military as a
punishment.120 The majority opinion held that strikers were “violating a trust imposed on them
when the Army allowed their deferment” from the draft.121 The 20% minority who opposed this
idea did so mostly because they thought that conscription “would make a poor soldier out of a
striker.”122 Many Americans believed that strikes negated the fact that workers who went on
strike were exempted from conscription. “If they refuse to work, the draft boards should
reclassify their ratings and put them in 1A [available for military service classification], where
they can be called on to shoulder a gun.”123
Not all Americans who were hostile to strikes believed in extreme efforts that would put
workers in harm’s way. As the strike wave of 1941 and the inevitability of entering into the
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conflagration of war loomed large in the public imagination, a series of national polls were
conducted. These surveys concerning labor’s role in national defense were conducted by Dr.
George Gallup and the American Institute of Public Opinion. The results showed an increasing
distrust of the American public towards labor and unions. In March of 1941, 72% of polled
Americans supported anti-strike legislation which would hamper worker’s ability to strike.124
This is revealing as it demonstrated the publics lack of faith in the validity of the No-Strike
Pledge. Over a month later, however, another national poll revealed that “more than two-thirds
of the voters have said that strikes in defense industries should be prohibited and that a “cooling
off” period should be invoked during which time U.S. mediation could bring the disputing
parties to agreement.”125 Mediation would be arbitrated by a board made up of both labor leaders
and industrial owners. Several government boards were established to deal with the increasing
number of labor disputes but succumbed to the refusal of management to acknowledge the
board’s ruling and political in-fighting.
While much of the public fell in line with the popular narrative of the renegade striker
who needed to be drafted and controlled, a few voices rejected this mythology. What did the
dissenting minority believe and why did they sympathize with the strikers despite the abundant
valid reasons supplied by soldiers and civilians against sympathy? Those who challenged the
established narrative generally wrote from working-class dominated industrial cities like
Pittsburgh or Baltimore. The sympathetic public viewed the strikers demands of increased wages
as legitimate and rejected the claim that workers were becoming rich beyond their wildest
fancies. For example, A. Rectenwald wrote to the Pittsburgh Press in the winter of 1944 during a
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wave of steel strikes, “In the first place, why do workers demand more pay? Because they cannot
cover expenses with what is left over from their wages. Why? The OPA [Office of Price
Administration] allows prices to rise beyond the reach of wages, while the WPB [War
Production Board] does not allow an increase in wages.”126 This problem was well known and a
source of complaints. The Stabilization Act of 1942 froze the wages of many of the nation’s
workers and left their stagnant wages vulnerable to inflation. A cartoon critical of the damage
done by inflation of prices and frozen wages corroborated Rectenwald’s argument.
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In addition to this cartoon’s criticism of inflation and President Roosevelt’s desperation
to stop the rising prices and falling wages was the criticism of profiteering and greed of the
management and corporations which employed the workers. Edgar L. Kelly of Pittsburgh, PA
conceptualized workers serving a similar role to the armed forces as guarantors of liberty. “The
steel workers have to protect the rights of the men and women in the armed forces and not let the
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profiteers run the country.”128 In the eyes of some, a strike was a way to call to attention the
excessive war profits that defense industries reaped, which was tepidly covered by the media. In
the fight for democracy that many Americans supported abroad, it seemed scandalous and
hypocritical to tolerate plutocracy on the home front. “Most strikes are caused by economic
inequality – the result of unequal distribution of wealth…and unsatisfactory working conditions.
The worker creates a large part of the profits that are pocketed by industry. Therefore it seems
logical that he be permitted to share in them.”129 Another sympathetic citizen, A.L. McCray of
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania blamed the industrial powers in America for cynically using patriotic
rabblerousing for their selfish purposes. “The Tory capitalist in times past has always taken
refuge behind an army of professional soldiers…the Tory tries to drive a wedge between the
working man in uniform and the working man in overalls by propagandizing a few threatened
strikes.”130 McCray lampooned industrial powers in language that evoked the American
Revolution, referring to them as Tories (loyalist Americans who supported the British empire
during the revolution). He also argued that workers and soldiers belonged to the same working
class. In response to those who criticized strikers as greedy and ungrateful, Edgar L. Kelley
retorted, “You say the Government is shamefully surrendering national issues to selfish issues?
The cost of living is surely an unselfish issue, and a national issue and the steel union means to
bring wages in line with the cost of living.”131 According to Kelley, the strikes that were
occurring were over affording the bare necessities of survival and not the product of a working
class luxuriating in excess.
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Several interesting phenomena were present during the public debate over wildcat
strikers. Despite the deluge of negative press and angry opinions from citizens that were directed
towards labor, public opinion polls sometimes portrayed contradictory findings. In 1941, the
American Institute of Public Opinion found that a majority of Americans harbored hostility and
condemnation toward unions. On May 6, 1942, a Gallup Poll asked Americans ‘Are you in favor
of labor unions?’ The poll reported that 67% of Americans answered that they were in favor of
labor unions.132 The strike problem did not vanish during 1942 nor did public anger against
unions abate. What was even more surprising and puzzling was that 66% of businessmen, 67%
of white-collar workers, and 77% of professional employees answered that they too were in
favor of labor unions.133 While only 37% of those polled believed that labor was doing
everything it could to win the war, the support of labor unions did not reflect their disapproval of
labor’s performance during the war.134
The second and more revealing part about the public debate about wartime strikes was
that the public and soldiers did not distinguish between a wildcat strike and a union-sanctioned
work stoppage. As a result, union leaders and labor organizations who were determined to keep
the No-Strike Pledge and desperate to quell rebellious workers’ efforts to stage unauthorized
strikes took the brunt of the blame for the interruption of production. Pleas to wildcat strikers
from union leaders became more frantic as the public invective increased. R.J. Thomas, president
of the United Automobile Workers (UAW) bemoaned that “public opinion has become inflamed
against our union. Word of these strikes is going to reach to our millions of men in uniform. Our
union cannot survive if the nation and our soldiers believe that we are obstructing the war
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effort.”135 Thomas’s comments on the wildcat strikes typify the confusion and loss of control
faced by union leaders
“Wrong Way War!”

136

Labor unions occupied a vulnerable sliver of the public debate over wildcat strikes. Their
opinions were caught between the strict patriotic adherence to the No-Strike Pledge, exasperation
at the prospect of losing control over their rank-and-file members, and anger towards the
perceived betrayal of the war effort by big business’s blatant profiteering and lack of patriotic
sacrifice. Above all else, the labor unions harbored a righteous indignation towards the media
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and the majority of the public for holding them personally responsible for the wildcat strike
waves which spread despite labor’s best efforts to contain and pacify them.
Labor unions were anxious to represent themselves as loyal adherents to the No-Strike
Pledge and the patriotism that it symbolized. This was achieved through the constant reiteration
of the Pledge, even when strikes seemed to contradict these statements. “The CIO at the outset of
this war gave its no-strike pledge which it has religiously maintained…the Md.-D.C. Industrial
Union Council hereby reaffirms its solemn pledge without any qualifications or conditions that
for the duration of the war there must not be any strike or stoppage of work.”137 This treatment of
the purposeful abstention of strikes was referred to multiple times in almost quasi-religious
overtones. Representatives of the CIO wrote about the labor organization’s “solemn duty”138 to
keep the No-Strike Pledge, its “devotion to victory above all else,”139 and its willingness to
“suffer the injustices”140 of various aspects of the wartime economy.
The leadership of the CIO wasted little time in condemning those workers who did decide
to break the pledge. In the midst of a strike wave in 1944 which saw a total of 4,956 strikes and
lockouts (over 200 more strikes and involving hundreds of thousands more workers than the
legendary labor unrest of 1937)141, the UAW passed a resolution which proposed a more
aggressive policy of discipline. This promised “to proceed even to the extent of revoking charters
and reorganizing locals which fail to take the proper steps to comply with the constitution and
the no-strike pledge.”142 The threat of expelling union members or dissolving whole local
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organizations for striking against the CIO’s wishes betrayed the desperation that labor unions
faced in regaining control of its unions. This sentiment was mirrored by the President of the CIO,
Phillip Murray, in a speech to steelworkers shortly after. “If I thought that any of you were going
to participate in wildcat strikes or slowdowns, I couldn’t be your leader any longer.”143
Since American soldiers were the most popular concern and invocation within the debate
on wildcat strikes, the CIO also used the image of directly supporting the soldiers in war through
meeting wartime production quotas as a way to counteract the accusations of disloyalty and
indignant letters from soldiers in Europe and the Pacific theatres of war. These invocations also
tried to link the titanic efforts of the union and its workers to the successes at war. The story that
Staff Stg. Richard J. McHugh related to a CIO affiliated newspaper shortly after the allied
invasion of Normandy provided ammunition for the union’s efforts to stand with the soldiers on
the front: “Several times, I saw trucks keep on advancing with their radiators and chassis shot
through with holes and their drivers slouched dead over the wheel. It was almost as if the
vehicles were human and determined to carry on despite what the Jerries had done to them.”144
Stories like this showed that CIO affiliated workers and their enthusiasm for their work could
transcend the human and augment the performance of the machinery of warfare. This bond
between the union and soldiers through the high-quality weaponry that was produced was also
elucidated in a cartoon where the CIO was giving a progress report to the average American
soldier. “Our first big war job has been making those tanks and planes and guns you
need…we’ve broken plenty of records and we’ll smash a lot more of them. All-out, continuous
production, that’s what we’re here for.”145 With the emphasis that victory on the battlefield is
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contingent on the work that was facilitated by union card holding workers, the CIO suggested
that they were sacrificing the most and directly contributing the most to the victories that the
allies were experiencing with increasing regularity from 1943 to the end of the war.
The military did not fail to commend unions for their tireless work, welcome material
that labor newspapers were eager to publish. Stars and Stripes Army Newspaper published a
glowing defense of labor’s efforts: “Bad news travels fast. Labor strikes and lockouts are no
exception, for in a time of war such news is sensational. The loyalty of American labor, on the
other hand, seldom makes the headlines, for in time of war such loyalty is expected and often
taken for granted.”146 The CIO also proudly noted praise by government officials at their
diligence and important role within the war effort. The Under-Secretary of War, Robert P.
Patterson said that “it is gratifying to note the excellent record made by your union [United
Electric, Radio, and Machine Workers of America] in observance of its no-strike pledge. With
that kind of backing, our soldiers will move into the decisive phase of the war with an
overwhelming superiority of firepower and equipment over the armies of Hitler and Hirohito.”147
This kind of praise from the military and government lent a measure of gravity to the claims of
labor. However, not all who read these stories were convinced of the loyalty of labor. As a result,
labor unions such as the CIO had to spend much of their resources defending themselves and
attacking those whom they saw as truly responsible for wildcat strikes.
Much of labor’s defense of itself rested in the accusation that the media and opponents
within the larger public debate cherry-picked isolated strikes as typifying aberrant behaviors. In
their opinion, the vast majority of workers were doing their duty yet were being smeared by the
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opponents of labor at every possible opportunity. “For instance, a single, short-lived wildcat
strike of a few hundred workers rates more press attention as ‘news’ than does the fact that
millions upon millions of other workers are faithfully observing their no-strike pledge.”148 This
accusation correlated with the opinions of pro-union soldiers like Stg. Chaves who claimed that
only one tenth of one percent of all production time was actually impeded by strikes or
slowdowns. An angry harangue delivered by union members to the editors of the Akron Beacon
Journal echoed similar sentiment. “Akron labor is becoming rather tired of being the whipping
boy for the Beacon’s editorial animus…Delays due to labor are played up on page 1. Delays –
many of them of long duration – due to faulty planning, lack of materials, and competitive
jockeying, and other causes are not mentioned.”149 These sentiments, which were supportive of
workers, balked at what was perceived to be a concerted smear campaign by united and
implacable enemies.
These enemies of labor – big business and the hostile media wanted to “concentrate on
conflict, on disagreement, and on the exceptional, rather than on attitudes and activities that are
the rule and not the exception.”150 The industrial titans, such as Ford and Dodge, were lightning
rod of blame for the labor unrest in the eyes of labor organizations. Union attitudes applied the
same monikers of sabotage and betrayal to large corporations that were often used to describe
labor organizations by angry soldiers and civilians. The initial refusal of corporate cooperation
with labor organizations in the 1941 meetings with President Roosevelt and the continued
agitation against workers who forsook their primary weapon against industrial management was
not viewed kindly. “The refusal to cooperate for a commonly recognized good is a strike. It is
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more than a strike – it is sabotage. Strikes and sabotage are not confined to factories or
mines…they occur in high places as well as low. They are plotted in dark corners and around
mahogany tables.”151
Underhandedness and dishonesty were also common condemnations that were leveled
against corporations. Corporations were aware of the negative press that surrounded strikes and
tried to use the popular indignation against unions. In August of 1943, amid the collective fury
directed against the UMW and John L. Lewis’s wildcat strikes, UAW President R.J. Thomas
accused Chrysler of circulating pamphlets which contained false information about his views on
strikes to workers in an attempt to incite the workers to go on strike.152 Since the No-Strike
Pledge’s efficacy was the subject of scrutiny and vituperation, additional strikes would have
rubbed proverbial salt in labor’s wounds and increased popular support for harsher anti-strike
legislation. This was seen again in the large racially motivated Philadelphia Transit Strike of
1944, where the CIO blamed the management for purposely stoking racial tensions with the goal
of starting a strike. The CIO stated that the media attention called to the violation of the NoStrike Pledge, President Roosevelt’s decision to order soldiers to break up the strike, and the
arrest of several union leaders was to “whitewash the real instigators of the strike located in high
places in industry, city government, and Republican organizations…the CIO has fought for equal
rights for all, against wartime strikes.”153
Finally, labor unions were apoplectic over the lack of Equality of Sacrifice that was being
carried out by big business and largely downplayed by the mainstream media of the day.

151

“Strikes and Sabotage” CIO News (Cumberland, MD), Oct. 9, 1944, 1.
“Chrysler Foments Strikes, UAW Charges” CIO News (Cumberland, MD), Aug. 3, 1943, 10.
153
“CIO Union Charges Transit Strike Report Used as a Political Weapon.” CIO News (Cumberland, MD), Oct. 9,
1944, 5.
152

53

154

Some newspapers such as The Capital Times in Washington D.C. followed the meteoric rise in
corporate profits and their findings were shocking. Despite the popular ideal of sacrifice and
denial on the American home front, companies in the defense industry such as “Harnishfeger
Corp. of Milwaukee, whose 1942 profits, after taxes, reached $2,795,000 as compared to
$561,000 in 1940. The Elastic Stop Nut Corp., with 1942 profits after taxes of $3,480,000
compared with $432,000 in 1940.”155 Extreme cases showed a staggering 2,820% increase in
profits by Bell Aircraft between 1940 and 1941.156 The Times went on further to explain that
these companies were actively engaged in “spending large sums for newspaper and magazine
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advertising claiming that business is not making money out of the war.”157 With this blatant
profiteering, the CIO went to great lengths to heap criticism on the lack of patriotism and the
preoccupation for material gains of business. The idea of Equality of Sacrifice, that promised that
if labor was going to forsake striking then business should have to forsake the pursuit of profits,
was challenged. An article in the CIO’s newspaper printed a skeptical story about the validity of
the Equality of Sacrifice. “It is questionable, too, whether cutting the richest married couple to
spending money of $50,000 a year represents an ‘equal sacrifice’ to that of a worker’s family
deprived of some of the bare necessities of life, and still less to that of the soldier who sacrifices
his life.”158 After all, an aggressive taxation of wartime profits which was still leading to 4-5 fold
increases in profit still would not compare to the destitution that some workers experienced.
Sacrifice was measured by suffering in this war, either from battlefield wounds, explosions in
mines, hunger ravaged stomachs, and weariness caused by long work hours. Business was not
incurring any of this. CIO President Murray put the strikes over minimal price raises into
perspective during a convention in 1942. “As to the corporate bigshots who have been arguing so
fervently against wages increases of a few cents for their employees: Eugene Green considered
5.5%, or 44 cents a day, too much of a boost for the steelworkers. But he took a raise of $55,000
himself – from $478,114 in 1940 to $537,724 in 1941.”159 These statistics carry an irony and a
challenge to the civilians and military personnel who accused labor of unduly profiting off of the
war without acknowledging the lack of economic sacrifice that Americans believed everyone
should undertake.
“We Were Allies of Hirohito”
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The perspective of the American worker during this time was not loud in this debate.
They were, however, angry and skeptical of many of the facets of this debate, such as the validity
of the Equality of Sacrifice campaign, the No-Strike Pledge, and the common misrepresentation
of workers as avaricious and money-hungry. They further felt alienated from unions who they
exceedingly viewed as strike-breakers and stooges of big business for enforcing the No-Strike
Pledge.
Many members of the working class were confused and embittered with the supposed
exchange of a No-Strike Pledge for guarantees of sacrifice and the forswearing of profits. During
the initial debate on how to implement the pledge, John McGill, a UAW member and worker at a
Flint, Michigan Buick factory vented his incredulity at this idea. “We figured that there would be
no such thing as equality of sacrifice. We just did not believe that. The only ones that were going
to sacrifice would be the workers themselves and the coupon clippers would soon get their take
even during wartime…the only effective weapon the worker has (were strikes) and we gave it
away.”160 Norm Bully, a fellow worker at the Flint GM plant, gave similar complaints about the
No-Strike Pledge since it gave companies and management permission to behave in a reactionary
and repressive manner towards the workers. “The company took advantage of this situation. The
fact that we pledged that we would not strike meant that when we went in to negotiate for
something, a mere “no” was enough.”161 The notion of the equality of sacrifice was met with
scorn by workers like Bully who opined that “The corporations were showing no sense of
patriotism or loyalty and were contributing nothing. All the sacrifices were on the part of the
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workers. When real and pressing grievances arose and there was no solution, management hid
behind the no-strike pledge.162
The opinions of these autoworkers agreed in their scorn for the lack of patriotism that
corporations showed. However, unlike the union leaders, many workers felt hamstrung by the
stipulations placed before them by their unions. People predictably responded to a perceived
pressure and a narrowing of avenues of redress with anger and disregard of conventional rules if
those regulations do not suit them. Workers responded to the rising economic pressures with the
most effective method they knew how – strikes and work stoppages. In 1942, a worker for Ford
vented that “A lot of these companies deserve to be treated pretty miserable. They treated us that
way during the depression. Didn’t even say, ‘sorry, old man, we ain’t got nothing for you today.’
Just said, ‘Get the hell out of here.’ So now it ain’t no wonder if some of the boys treat the
company miserable.”163 This sense of retribution was common among workers who expressed
their anger towards the No-Strike Pledge.
Many wartime workers and miners were also sharply indignant at the commonly held
view that they were striking because they were greedy and ungrateful to the sacrifices that the
soldiers were making. The desperate situations of workers who were being subjected to frozen
wages and raising inflation were expressed through interviews and letters written to local
newspapers. In 1943, a large number of miners wrote to their local papers in an effort to
broadcast their perspectives on the large UMW strikes. A miner who grimly called himself John
Burns expressed that the strikes were not because he wanted to increase his earnings. Instead,
“We coal miners are all true and hardy Americans who are only asking that our three meals be
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assured.”164 Four days later, a woman who identified herself as a miners’ wife, mother of a miner
and soldier boy wrote to the Knoxville Journal pleading for Americans to understand the
economic realities that were at work behind the strikes. “So many people really don’t know what
a miner’s wages are. This $12 to $14 a day isn’t true. All shift men don’t get seven dollars a day.
My husband only gets $6.72 a day.”165 For other miners, they claimed that they did not have
fixed wage, but instead fluctuated for better or worse. “Most miners do not have a guaranteed
wage for their day’s work. What they make is based on their strength and skill.”166
The hidden costs that reduced their paycheck concealed a grim reality behind the
loosened safety regulations and enormous risks that miners bore. At this point in the war, miners
had higher casualty rates than American soldiers fighting in the war. “By May 1943, US armed
forces in World War II tallied 27,172 killed or wounded. During the same 17 months, mining
accidents had claimed 34,000 injured and almost 2,000 dead.”167 Another miner’s wife from
West Frankfort, Illinois wrote about the incessant mining injuries as if they were almost a
universal phenomenon: “You can walk down the street of this coal mining town and see men
minus arms, legs, hands, fingers from all from mine accidents. When he goes down that 500-foot
shaft, he doesn’t know whether he is coming out on his feet or a stretcher.”168 While low wages
and accidents rankled the working class, this only began to scratch the surface of their anger.
In 1942, journalist and labor activist, Mary Heaton Vorse travelled around the country to
interview wartime workers and take a sample of their opinions on their treatment in the war. Her
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summary, “And the Workers Say…,” was full of glum workers recounting their sense of
powerlessness and anger of poor working conditions within the defense industry. Workers
expressed skepticism at the efficacy of government mediation organizations like the National
Labor Relations Board to properly protect them. Vorse was told by a worker that before a factory
inspection that the factory management “ran the ventilation plant for the first time in over a year
last week when the Navy Inspectors went through.”169 Vorse independently noted that “Absence
of showers, insufficient, locker space, and even too few and filthy restrooms are found only too
often.”170
The demands of total war and raising quotas were mentioned by workers as irritants.
They felt that the endless demands of work rapidly encroached into their break time. A
shipbuilder in the Los Angeles Harbor area described the shortness of his lunch break with
exasperation. Breaks began and ended with the screech of a whistle to signal for workers to get
back to work. “Often the whistle blows before a man gets to the canteen or wolfs down what he
has. The food’s all caked with grease, so the men throw it on the ground.”171 Vorse noted that
these working conditions harkened back to Great Depression levels of wretchedness. “The
conditions under which shipbuilders eat are as bad as the food; some canteens have four lines
converging on them from different directions, and those lines barely move. The workers stand,
shoulders hunched, rain dripping from them, waiting for their turn at the canteen. Watching this
at night is like seeing the most miserable breadline of depression days.”172 While Vorse’s
observations may appear to be laced with sensationalism, the workers corroborated her story to
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various degrees. “Why don’t you print some pictures of mining towns and miners’ homes, and
tell the public of the conditions under which the miners work?”173 Ray Storey of Avery, Iowa
similarly directed a scathing rebuttal against the public for being willfully ignorant of the
conditions of working people. “Mrs. Harvey Phillip’s letter said the coal miners have their
homes, beds, and free sunshine. I wonder where they get sunshine, working underground in
damp artificial air. She must have seen a strip pit once. She is right about no bombs dropping,
but a miner is in danger at all times, poison gases, falling slate, and gas explosions. Surely she
has read of the mine disasters.”174
The public debate surrounding the wildcat strike waves during World War II were heated
and fractious. Each side of the debate, American soldiers, civilians, labor unions, and workers
within the defense industry, believed that their perspectives were not understood by their
countrymen and countrywomen. The soldiers were generally incensed by the feeling of betrayal
on the home front with a few notable exceptions from union card carrying military personnel and
civil rights conscious troops. The American public decried both the lack of consideration and
sacrifice that strikers showed with a loud minority of working-class citizens who believed that
strikers were being smeared and misunderstood. Prominent labor organizations such as the CIO
believed that wildcat strikes were an anomaly that were taken advantage of by a coalition of
labor’s enemies: the mainstream media and large corporations. Finally, workers felt angry due to
the lack of understanding of the economic destitution and physical risks involved while working
in the defense industry.
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Chapter 4: The Answer

1

Nineteen Forty-Three was a tempestuous year on the home front in the United States.
While spreading race riots blighted the image of domestic unity like black ink stains on a white
starched shirt, the strike wave typified by John L. Lewis and the United Mine Workers (UMW)
was the crown jewel of vituperation and discord. It started with an anthracite strike, which
extended from December 30, 1942 to January 22, 1943. This strike swept up resentful miners as
it grew to encompass 15,000-25,000 of the 80,000 existing anthracite harvesters.2 This
galvanized miners who were already upset and angry over their low wages and high rates of
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mortality. The situation was further exacerbated by the volcanic personality of the UMW’s
president, John L. Lewis. During the early months of 1943, Lewis was called to testify before the
Senate about his miner’s actions. An apoplectic Lewis declared that the No-Strike Pledge was
void by alterations of the Little-Steel wage formula which allowed a 15% wage increase to cover
the inflationary costs of living.3 He furthermore erupted at various senators and future president
Harry Truman: “Hunger is a relative term. I said the coal miners are hungry, they suffer from a
dietary insufficiency. When you say I am a demagogue I say to you that you are less than a
proper representative of the common people.”4
Attempts to negotiate for a wage increase in the new annual contracts were interrupted by
President Roosevelt’s “Hold the Line” executive order which effectively froze wages as a
measure to combat inflation. In late April, Lewis defied the War Labor Board’s (WLB) summons
to negotiate the new contract within the confines of frozen wages and a demand for uninterrupted
coal production.5 As wildcats spread and workers’ tempers flared, President Roosevelt ordered
miners back to work. Despite the President’s wishes, all UMW mines shut down on May 1.
Roosevelt ordered all striking mines to be seized and operated by the government in order to
prevent a lapse in coal production. The miners were unmoved by the President’s pleas and his
May 2 radio address, only returning to work on May 4 in accordance to a 15-day truce called by
Lewis.6 Over the summer and most of the autumn, strikes spiraled out of control which
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culminated into the National War Labor Board (NWLB) capitulating to the miner’s demands for
a pay raise on November 20, 1943.7
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Throughout this fight between the UMW and the government, the public and media
screamed in inchoate rage. Newspapers during this time choked with indignation. Westbrook
Pegler, a prominent media commentator attributed “strike, riot, and pillage against the lawful
established government, the public authority and the peace and security of the United States” to
Lewis’s actions.9 An editorial written in Union, Missouri captured the special hatred that
Americans felt towards Lewis. “I suspect that a great deal of interest and most of the indignation
over the coal strike comes from the fact that it is John L. Lewis’ strike.”10 This sentiment was
repeated ad nauseum. For example, the digital archive Newspapers contains 32,505 mentions of
John L. Lewis between the months of May and June, 1943 and 128,387 individual articles about
him dated from 1942-1944. It appears that this concentrated coverage on various strikes and antilabor sentiment had an impact on the public mood during the duration of the war. In the spring of
1943, as the UMW strike wave began to gain momentum, the American Institute for Public
Opinion (AIPO) and the Gallup Poll began to concentrate on the public opinions views of the
labor movement’s role of the war effort. An AIPO poll taken on May 4, 1943, the day which
Lewis’s UMW decided to return to work, found that 72% of Americans favored a law which
forbade strikes during wartime.11 What is more interesting is that the AIPO reported that 64%
unionized war workers believed that strikes should be outlawed.12
This was a paradox which has befuddled researchers of labor and class, as Martin
Glaberman notes that a majority of workers in the auto industry were staunch supporters of the
No-Strike Pledge but also overwhelmingly participated in wildcat strikes.13 It later noted that
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public regard of labor unions dropped by 38% on May 13, 1943. As the crisis deepened into the
summer of 1943, the American public was galvanized and saturated with stories of John L.
Lewis’s intransigence. An AIPO poll reported on June 17 that 87% of Americans had
unfavorable opinions of Lewis14 which was hardly surprising given the amount of attention he
was receiving. Furthermore, as the truce that Lewis called began to deteriorate, a staggering 78%
of Americans supported laws which would make striking a crime and result in a seizure by the
government.15 With such levels of publicity and outrage, it was only a matter of time for the
machinery of government to respond in kind.
The Smith Connally Act
The War Labor Disputes Act, popularly referred to as the Smith-Connally Act, was
introduced by Senator Thomas Connally of Texas in September of 1942. The bill largely echoed
public wishes and gave “statutory authority to the President to seize war facilities, made it a
criminal offense to instigate, direct, or aid a strike in a Government-operated plant or mine,
prohibited, for the period of the war, political contributions by labor organization, and required
the representative of employees of a war contractor to give notice of a labor dispute which
threatens seriously to interrupt war production,” according to President Roosevelt’s
interpretation of the bill.16 This bill reiterated the president’s existing power to seize mines via
executive order as demonstrated by Roosevelt’s seizure of striking UMW mines a month before
the passage of the bill. This was also designed to target the political influence of unions and
reflected the public concern of racketeering and malfeasance in handling union dues and other
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funds, as racketeering was a common trope of anti-labor sentiment.17 Finally, the bill called for a
30 day “cool down” period before a union could actually carry out a strike. Between the time that
a strike was announced, the WLB would adjudicate the case closely and try to head off any
potential strike actions. If this was not followed, the union involved would be liable for any
damages or financial loss that occurred during the strike.
The congressional debate surrounding the bill was heated and contentious. On May 5,
1943, the Senate convened to vote on its passage and present final arguments on the merits and
demerits of the bill. Among the defenders of the bill, a common argument was that Congress had
been too slow to react to the issue and waited to address strikes only when they had reached a
fevered pitch. Senator Robert Taft (R-OH) claimed that “The matter has been before the Senate
for 2 years; it has been in every Senator's mail; it has been in every Senator's consideration; it has
been given, in the Senate, the fullest kind of debate. In my opinion, the people of the country
desire the Congress to deal with strikes.”18 This populist appeal to listen to the people of
America was echoed by Sen. Connally and Sen. Wilbert O’Daniel (D-TX) and to do their job as
legislators. “We cannot afford to admit that our arms are paralyzed and our brains numb and our
consciences dead, when the country calls for action.”19 O’Daniel charged that the strike problem
was led by “labor leader racketeers.”20 Furthermore, due to the novel nature of the SmithConnally Act, Sen. Connally described using the power to legislate in new territory was an act of
“courage”.21
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Other arguments in favor of anti-strike legislation drew on legal and literal interpretations
of the No-Strike Pledge and seizures of striking facilities. In response to the worries raised about
the legality of President Roosevelt’s seizure of the mine, Sen. Alben Barkley (D-VA) stated that
the President’s constitutional role as commander and chief legitimized the action. “The
Constitution also places on the President the responsibility and vests in him the powers of
Commander in Chief of the Army and of the Navy. These weapons for the protection of the
continued existence of the Nation are placed in his sole command and the implication is clear
that he should not allow them to become paralyzed by failure to obtain supplies.”22 This rationale
of war materials falling under the jurisdiction of the Commander in Chief was also used in the
mammoth North American Aviation strike of 1941. Sen. Taft viewed anti-strike legislation as
little more than insurance for the No-Strike Pledge – if there was such a pledge in place, there is
not a reason to object to a law which prohibits strikes. “The labor unions and all the employers
agreed that the men would not strike, but would continue to work on the terms on which they
were working…certainly the men cannot object and the unions cannot object, and there is no
basis for any such objection or argument.”23 Furthermore, Taft evoked the age old conservative
argument about addressing poor working conditions – “the men have the right to quit.”24
Later deliberations in the Senate before the passage of the bill in the house revolved
around the conception of the UMW strikes as an existential threat to the United States. Sen.
Harry Byrd (D-VA) stated on June 4, as negotiations began to break down between the UMW
and the WLB, that “today America is faced with the greatest threat on her home front since the
dastardly attack at Pearl Harbor. There must be no compromise on the issue of whether John
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Lewis or the constitutional authorities govern our Republic.”25 The suggestions that John L.
Lewis was guilty of treason and being an enemy of the people were also liberally used by angry
senators. Sen. James Eastland (D-MI) claimed that “I think John L. Lewis should be in jail. His
acts amount to treason. Lewis is as deadly an enemy of America as Hitler and Tojo.”26
The discussion of the dangers of labor movements, however, did move beyond intangible
assertions and over-zealous acclamations. Sen. O’Daniels spent a considerable amount of time
reading telegrams and news stories to the senate about the violence that was perpetrated by labor
racketeers. One story, which accused AFL “goon squads” of attacking workers and contractors
who were not unionized, claimed that “Blood will run like water in southeastern Missouri, Scott,
and Girardeau Counties unless the Government steps in at once Monday to rid labor racketeers
from interference with peaceful construction...”27 Many of these stories also involved labor
contractors who were found dead under mysterious circumstances from gunshot wounds in the
back. Furthermore, if these strikes were not quickly contained, they would invariably lead to
“force and violence being used, and possibly the shedding of blood, and perhaps many men will
lose their lives.”28 This accusation of O’Daniels was quite pernicious, as it connected violent
crimes and stories with unrelated workers and their struggles for better working conditions. The
implication of labor leaders acting more harmfully than Hitler’s Fascism and Emperor Hirohito’s
Militarism was quite astounding as one sought the betterment of working conditions the other
sought genocide and aggressive expansionism.
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The opposition of the Smith-Connally Act was heated, even though the bill was passed
with relative ease. Early arguments cited a point that labor organizations held: that such a law
would only serve to agitate the working class into further action. Sen. Robert Wagner (D-NY),
an ardent opponent of anti-strike legislation, thought that such measures would make the United
States appear more authoritarian. “I think the idea of criminal compulsion is repugnant. I do not
think that a provision of this kind in the bill would be of any help, it has never worked when tried
in other democratic countries, and in my opinion the American worker will resent it.”29 The
number of telegrams from angry workers and union leaders that were read to the Senate
resoundingly spoke of the resentment that workers felt towards the government. Philip Murray,
president of the CIO, telegrammed to accuse Congress of the “repression and degradation of the
living standards of labor.”30 Martin Wagner, the president the United Gas, Coke, and Chemical
Workers of America, said that the Smith-Connally Act was “legislation designed only to
humiliate and discourage them [the workers].”31 Furthermore, the criminalization of strikes,
which would presumably lead to the incarceration of striking workers would furthermore hurt the
morale and choleric temperament of workers. Sen. Wagner noted that heavy-handed labor laws
in Britain in the war backfired and led to the unjust imprisonment of factory workers who were
seeking redress. He noted that “that workers in jail produce no more war materials than soldiers'
bayonets.”32 Thus, not only does imprisonment wound morale but it also wastes precious
resources that are needed to power the engine of a total war economy.
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Senators Burton Wheeler (D-MT), Arthur Shipstead (R-MN), and John Danaher (R-CT)
raised the issue of the fairness of the mediation process of the WLB. Sen. Wheeler stated that
from speaking to the striking miners, they felt that approaching the WLB to arbitrate a wage
increase was fruitless due to President Roosevelt’s “Hold the Line” executive order which froze
wages.33 Therefore, asking the proper authorities for a needed pay raise when the answer would
automatically be in the negative was a waste of everybody’s time. Sen. Wheeler analogized the
miner’s plight thusly: “I would not go into a court to try a case if I thought the court was
prejudiced; and no other lawyer who has the interests of his client at heart would go into a court
if he thought it was prejudiced or if he thought the case had been decided in advance or if he
thought that, because of an order which had been issued by the President, the court could not
give him justice.”34 Sen. Shipstead cast further aspersions on the impartiality of the WLB by
citing discriminatory practices within the organization, which were covered in the newspapers
recently. “I am told that at one time two members of the Board were officers and members of the
union (UMW), and were removed as officers and as members of the union.”35 If the Board does
not tolerate union representatives and members within their ranks, how could they be trusted to
fairly judge the case and influencing conditions of the miners? Sen. Shipstead further elaborated
that the “misery and destitution and the bad living conditions and poor working conditions” of
miners was to such a degree that one must see and experience them for themselves in order to
believe these legends of squalor.36 Without members to impart such experience on the Board, its
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judgement would be severely impaired and incapable of considering the dire situations in which
miners existed.
Finally, while Senators Connally and Taft framed the passage of the bill in terms of
listening to the people who demanded all due haste, those in opposition to the bill and even some
supporters demanded more deliberation and cool consideration. Sen. Wheeler argued that the
very existence of hysteria in the American public over strikes is a reason itself to prolong
deliberations on the Smith-Connally Act. In replying to Sen. Connally’s demand for courage,
Sen. Wheeler retorted: “Where is the courage? Because some persons are saying that we ought to
take every workingman out and shoot him, Members of Congress become frightened and
intimidated. Because the great newspapers in the East are harping on one thing, and all the
financial interests are saying we ought to do this or do that, members of Congress are intimidated
and frightened.”37 This call for cool-headedness of governance has roots that trace back to James
Madison’s vision of a republic’s role “to guard against the confusion of a multitude” in
Federalist Papers No. 10.38 Wheeler also viewed the mainstream newspapers such as the New
York Times as culpable for the tide of anti-labor sentiment and misrepresenting the causes of the
strikes. Sen. Barkley echoed this sentiment and took issue with Sen. Connally’s exhortation to
courage. “With the excited temper of the people who have been aroused by a particular situation,
it takes more courage to vote against a bill than it does to vote for it.” Once again, the
Madisonian dispassionate approach to governance appeared in the halls of the Senate.
Furthermore, the chiding of the Senate for not acting with courage and the implication of
cowardice was not acceptable to Sen. Wheeler. “When any Senator denounces the Senate and
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calls it cowardly, and says it must act, he is like the bird which befouls its own nest.”39 While
these vigorous objections were raised, they were not enough. The bill was overwhelmingly
passed in the Senate with 63 voting in favor, 16 voting against, and 17 abstentions on May 5,
1943. The bill passed in the House of Representatives with similar ease on June 12, 1943 with
233 voting for and 141 voting against the passage of the Smith-Connally Act.
The last barricade that the Smith-Connally Act had to overcome was the presidential
veto. As a long-time friend of labor, President Roosevelt’s objections both defended the
American workforce and expressed support for anti-strike legislation. In his veto letter, which
was read to the Senate on June 25, 1943, the president opened with an acknowledgement of the
sterling effort of the labor force. “For the entire year of 1942, the time lost by strikes averaged
only five one-hundredths of 1 percent of the total man-hours worked. The American people
should realize that fact-that ninety-nine and ninety-five one hundredths percent of the work went
forward without strike.”40 This statistic was the same that was cited in Stars and Stripes defense
of the efforts of American workers. The president, along with other defendants of the labor
movement in World War II, sought to dispel the hysterical accusations of labor losing the war
and reminded the American public that strikes made up an infinitesimally small percentage of the
total work completed. The president later confessed that he did not take issue with the
criminalization of strikes in government-run facilities or with his prerogatives to seize striking
industrial instillations that were vital to the war effort.41 “This [Section 6 of the Smith-Connally
Act] would make possible the arrest of a few leaders who would give bond for their appearance
at trial. It would assure punishment for those found guilty, and might also have some deterrent
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effect.”42 Thus, Roosevelt broke with labor and its congressional allies with his allowance of
imprisoning strike leaders, something that would have been unthinkable in his tenure during the
1937 strike wave.
The president’s objections resonated with the “cooling off” period before a strike could
take place. This objection was based in his belief that requiring labor leaders to provide a 30-day
notice before going on strike would invalidate and obliquely subvert the principles of the NoStrike Pledge. “In wartime we cannot sanction strikes with or without notice… Section 8 ignores
completely labor's "no strike'' pledge and provides in effect for strike notices and strike ballots.
Far from discouraging strikes these provisions would stimulate labor unrest and give
Government sanction to strike agitations.”43 This objection is interesting because it dovetailed
with the beliefs of labor organizations that the Smith-Connally Act would serve to aggravate the
workers, but still was argued within the framework of supporting anti-strike measures.
Additionally, the President Roosevelt disapproved of the prohibition of political contributions of
labor organizations. “This provision obviously has no relevancy to a bill prohibiting strikes
during the war in plant.”44
In closing his letter, the president submitted his suggestions as to what should be done
about the epidemic of strikes. In some ways, it was harsher and more draconian than the
prohibitions of the bill. His idea for quelling strikes was “induct into military service all persons
who engage in strikes or stoppages or other interruptions of work in plants in the possession of
the United States. This direct approach is necessary to ensure the continuity of war work.”45 The
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forcible drafting of striking Americans shows the dubious lengths that wartime governments
often strive in order to maintain order on the home front. While Roosevelt does vaguely suggest
that all of these draftees would not be sent into combat roles, this act of compulsion and
conscription was vicious and reflected some of the more extreme views of the public’s
expression on what to do with striking workers. The veto was overridden by the Senate, only 25
Senators voted in favor of supporting the president’s motion.
The idea of the Smith-Connally Act was met with strong support from the public and
revulsion from labor organizations. Due to the visibility of the labor problem in 1943, 75% of
Americans reported in a Gallup Poll that they have heard of or read about the bill and 67%
supported it.46 This is a telling statistic considering that only 52% of Americans knew what the
Little Steel Formula was by the end of the war, even though the Little Steel Formula influenced
the livelihood of most Americans during war-time.47 The responses to the bill ranged from
skepticism from the media, mixed optimism from the public, and prophecies of damnation from
labor unions.
Newspapers enthusiastically covered the developments of the Smith-Connally Act yet
many thought that it was not strong enough to completely deter strikes. There was a common
theme that while it was a step in the right direction, it was not enough. “The Smith Connally Act,
as a matter of fact, is not an especially strong weapon against strikes in war industry. It outlaws
strikes only when the government has taken possession of war plants.”48 Despite the questionable
interpretation of the law by The Daily Telegram, its sentiments were shared. A few months after
it was passed, a reprinted article from the New York Times reported that “The more experience
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we have with it, the more ill-considered and mischievous many of the provisions of the miscalled
Anti-Strike act appear to be.”49 The article considered that the 30 day cooling off period was
counterproductive and served to agitate instead of cool the tempers of workers. The Baltimore
Sun reported that the Smith-Connally act “does not provide an impeccable plan for such control
(of strikes). The bill was enacted in a hurry. It is internally incoherent, for unquestionably
experience under it, if it is firmly and fairly enforced, will indicate changes that can be made by
later legislation.”50
While it acted as a first step, the lack of provisions in place for the conscription of strikers
did not actually deter strikes There was also the sense that the Smith-Connally Act was such a
common sense provision that it “should have been written long ago, in calmer times.”51 This
unhappiness with the perceived laxity of the bill by the media was also tinged with a panicked
hysteria over the possible political ramifications over the strike which bordered on the
conspiratorial. A newspaper columnist, Sam Tucker, believed that the Smith-Connally Act
created a dangerous opening for unions. “Suppose, for example, that the governing board of the
CIO should decide that national socialism is an experiment worth trying in the United States. The
Smith-Connally Act provides all the power that is needed, in order to change our entire economic
organization.”52 Tucker’s confused terminology of national socialism referred to the
sovietization of the United States economics, not Hitler’s national socialism due to the
government running defense industrial instillations (which they had already heavily subsidized).
While this may seem an odd reaction, it was not the only one. “Moreover, it [the government

49

“Pro-And-Anti-Strike Act” Dayton Daily News (Dayton, OH), Sept. 2, 1943.
“Let The President Sign The Smith-Connally Bill” The Baltimore Sun (Baltimore, MD), Jan. 20, 1943.
51
“Take Time To Be Right” Pittsburgh Press (Pittsburgh, PA), May 13, 1943.
52
“As I View the Thing” The Decatur Herald (Decatur, GA), Aug. 22, 1943.
50

75

seizure of mines] establishes A COMMUNISTIC PRINCIPLE. IT VIRTUALLY
ELIMIMINATES PRIVATE ENTERPRISE FROM THE COAL MINING INDUSTRY.”53 This
panicky response reveals much about the fear and outrage that the coal strikes produced in the
war’s dire hour.
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that John L. Lewis should be brought up with a round turn, and congress has responded” two
days after the overridden veto.55 Some newspapers could not contain their mockery of Lewis’s
fallen fortunes with the passage of the bill. Several small-town papers reported on the perceived
effectiveness of the bill: “now all that is changed, and the roaring lion of the UMW becomes as a
lamb in its [the WLB] presence. Score one for the anti-strike legislation!”56 An article published
in Oshkosh, Wisconsin sarcastically quipped that “Under the Smith-Connally act, it is illegal to
strike in a government operated war industry. What a fine example for the nation and for the men
overseas of united effort to win the war!” (Pause for Bronx cheers.)”57
Labor’s Outrage
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The passage and implementation of the No-Strike Pledge was not well received by labor
organizations and unionized workers. To them, the law was heavy-handed and punished the vast
majority of the workforce who had faithfully held to the No-Strike Pledge throughout the
hardships on the home front. The CIO met the passage of the bill with shock and outrage.
“Taking full advantage of the John L. Lewis strike in the coal fields, the US Senate this week
rushed through – with only two days of debate and without hearings – the Connally bill (S796)
that subjects unions to criminal penalties…that throws collective bargaining apparatus into the
lap of the courts and endless litigation.”59 While the CIO struggled throughout the war to contain
the spread of wildcat strikes, they saw this as an example of anti-labor elements making use out
of the crisis of the UMW strikes. The cresting tide of popular indignation allowed a narrow
window to pass reactionary legislation that would far outlive the problem that it was created to
address. They also cast aspersions on its legitimacy by noting the lack of a public hearing to
“give labor people a chance to show Congress the unfairness of such a measure and adverse
impact its passage would have upon the morale of the workers and their sons and brothers in the
armed forces.”60
This idea of the Smith-Connally Act and the haste in which it was passed acting as a way
to silence the working class’s voice in the matter was taken up elsewhere. Len De Caux, a
worker and columnist for the CIO News, noted acerbically that “A complete give-away of the
anti-democratic intent of the Smith-Connally Bill is its ban on political contributions by labor
unions…the workers, under this bill, are denied the right to poll their meager resources through
their unions to offset the political influence of the wealthy.”61 De Caux’s concern about the
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increasing cashflow and sway which wealthy families infused into political sphere of the 1940’s
creates an uncomfortable parallel to the modern reader after the passage of Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission which allowed for unlimited private donations. The CIO also
claimed that “It is actually designed to provoke strikes, rather than to stop them.”62 Perhaps they
were correct in assuming that this bill would be added to the mountain of irritants that workers
faced, as the instances of strikes jumped from 3,734 in 1943 to 4,958 in 1944 and turned into a
mammoth general strike wave in 1945-46.63 Even pro-business media outlets had not failed to
notice the effect that the law had on workers and questioned if the Smith-Connally Act was the
correct solution to the problem of labor unrest. “The law has fomented strikes, has encouraged
wildcat stoppages, and has ‘been responsible for a resurgence in political activity in the AFL and
CIO which promises to make itself felt distinctly in 1944,’ Business Week declared.”64
The American Federation of Labor (AFL), responded with similar outrage and
accusations of betrayal. They, however, spent a considerable amount of time addressing and
analyzing specific mechanics of the Smith-Connally Act. In Section 6a-2 of the law, while
banning the aiding or guidance of a lockout or strike, it also contradictorily states that “No
individual shall be deemed to have violated the provisions of this section by reason only of his
having ceased work or having refused to continue to work or to accept employment.”65 It was not
forbidden for an individual to walk off the job and withhold their labor, however it was illegal to
be seen discussing or planning to do so. This oddity was examined closely in the American
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Federationist, the AFL’s monthly periodical. “Thus, workers who are unjustly dealt with, or who
believe they have just grievances, will be compelled to cease exercising the right to free speech
and discussion of their grievances in the open because to do so will subject them to
prosecution.”66 This section could be liberally interpreted, as complaining about poor work
conditions or wages could be viewed as agitation and “giving direction or guidance in the
conduct of such interruption” (a work stoppage) as according to Section 6a-2 of the bill.67 Such
vague wording could have invited abuses of the law and the AFL was very concerned about the
possible consequences that would follow the Smith-Connally Act. “The first act of a dictatorship
is to prohibit freedom of speech, freedom of press, and of assemblage. That is exactly what
Section 6 does.”68
Along with President Roosevelt’s objections with the “cooling off” period, the AFL did
not miss the impact that it would have on the efficacy of the No-Strike Pledge. “Section 8
ignores completely the no-strike pledge and provides, in effect, for strike notices and strike
ballots. Far from discouraging strikes, these provisions would stimulate labor unrest and give
government sanction to strike agitations.”69 Unions were once again struck by the oddity of
acknowledging the validity of striking in a law that was ostensibly designed to prevent war-time
strikes. By the allowance of a thirty-day notice for a strike and secret ballots, the AFL was
worried that this would serve as a distraction from production. Instead of focusing on
maintaining quotas of vital materials, workers would have been consumed with discussing
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whether or not they should go on strike and recruiting votes for or against the strike for the secret
ballot.70
The AFL further agreed with President Roosevelt’s condemnation of the prohibition on
political contributions of labor organizations. To them, this section of the law provided a strong
case for the dubious constitutionality of this law. This provision “is to discriminate against labor
unions in a manner which renders the law unconstitutional, under those provision of the
Constitution which guarantee to all persons and organizations similarly situated the equal
protection of the law.”71 Under this argument, if the government wanted to prohibit labor
organizations from financially aiding in elections, they would also have to prohibit farmers
organizations, fraternal orders, and various interest groups from political contributions.
War workers within the AFL expressed a variety of reactions related to the passage of
Smith-Connally Act. In their letters to the American Federationist, some addressed John L.
Lewis directly. H.C. Leshinski of Chicago of Lewis “He has been attacked viciously by the
press. So what? That doesn’t make him a bad labor leader…He fights hard for the workers he
represents. What’s wrong with that?”72 This hostility to the media and its treatment of the war
effort among war worker’s letters was common. Leshinski further quipped “Even if you dislike
Lewis, use your head. Don’t forget this war will end some day and then watch the enemies of
labor try to do a job on us.”73 This was indicative of a common interest and fear among both
civilians and laborites about the condition of the economy after the war. Would it lapse into
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another depression or could the industrial might of the United Sates be reconverted to produce
consumer goods?
This sympathy was not universal. Al Danaher of Bridgeport blamed Lewis for all of
labor’s woes. “We feel that the only reason we have a Smith-Connally Law is because of the
three strikes pulled by the United Mine Workers.”74 Danaher continued by warning of Lewis’s
pernicious influence on the labor movement as a whole. “As a plain worker I ask that all the
responsible leaders of our movement take the same position. John L. Lewis will ruin if he can’t
rule…Keep him out. He’s a menace.”75 Lewis’s bombastic personality made many in the labor
movement dislike him, especially his leadership style of despotism and maintaining a clique of
sycophants in the UMW.76
Other workers turned their annoyance and disgust away from Lewis and towards
Congress. A reader who signed their name as Just A Worker from Columbus, GA wrote to the
Federationist to express their scorn for a hypocritical view of absenteeism. “Congressmen have
been deploring strikes, absenteeism…all this is wonderful as long as it does not apply to them.
But all of a sudden they realize the weather is warm, very warm, and that a vacation would be
very nice. Not an ordinary vacation, but a three-month vacation with pay.”77 This anonymous
worker was referring to the various congressional recesses that take place for holidays and during
the month of August. For a wartime worker who was working 60-70 hours a week and 6 or 7
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days a week, they naturally would feel scorn for talk of absenteeism from politicians who were
vacationing for lengths unimagined to someone in a munitions plant or tank factory.
This AFL worker’s sentiments were also shared by some angry civilians in Northeastern
industrial bastions of war workers who likened the bill to fascism. Arthur W. Abbott wrote to the
Pittsburgh Press in the summer of 1943 to express his alarm for the passage of the SmithConnally Act. “One-half million half-starved coal miners can’t be wrong…I have a son in
Africa, and I thought I knew what he was over their fighting for, but now that we have slave
labor like Hitler, I’m confused.”78 While certain congressmen and elements within the media saw
the Smith-Connally Bill as communist, other citizens saw the bill in terms of compulsion and
slavery through the silencing of strikes in protest of various industrial maladies. Another civilian,
Charles L. Bauer of Dayton, OH, saw the law in similar terms. Bauer’s chastisement of a
supporter of the bill included a suggestion that “he should be sure to have the law provide an
adequate reservoir of slave labor to replace the strikers. Perhaps Hitler could furnish him with a
few ideas along this line.”79
Further criticisms from upset civilians focused on the media’s culpability in fanning the
flames of hysteria which served as a catalyst for the passage of such a law. Chas Jackson of
Baltimore wrote that “Both Hitler and the Smith-Connally methods either compelling or
restricting the rights of workmen are unadulterated Nazi-ism. Yet the press, radio commentators,
a majority of those comprising Congress and a lot of sob sisters, forgetting the implications of
democracy and having succumbed to war hysteria, are content to adopt and follow the Hitlarian
brand of freedom.”80 Jackson’s ringing rebuke of the role of the media in the passage of the bill
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closely followed the AFL’s focus on the bill as a restrictor of civil liberties. It also called into
question the efficacy of the American political system, which served as an important distinction
between them and Nazi Germany. “The people of the United States are only entitled to enjoy and
have limited freedom as prescribed by the powers that be and not set forth in the Constitution of
the United States.”81 Such criticisms of the media were reported closely by the AFL.
The AFL acidly condemned on the role of the media in the passage of the SmithConnally Act. It is not a secret that the press was overwhelmingly anti-labor. The Federationist
targeted corporate friendly groups such as the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) for
its actions as propagandists and architects of widespread anti-labor sentiment. “After all, they got
the front-page headlines, they got the editorial comments. Their story was broadcast over the
radio. What they had to say was sensational and influenced the minds of millions of people.”82
The AFL believed that NAM was achieving their goal through mass advertising, pro-industry
propaganda, and anti-labor agitation. “In 1940, $450,000,000 was spend on advertising. In 1941,
$460,000,000. In 1941 – after Pearl Harbor - $440,000,000 was spent on advertising.
Advertisements repeat the theme, ‘We Make the Planes,’ ‘We Make the Guns,’ ‘We Make the
Tanks.’ And, by implication, ‘We Win the War.’”83 Through this strategy, progress of the war
and the impressive industrial output was shifted away from the efforts of the workers and
refocused on the sacrifices of corporate oligarchs in the eyes of the public. “Every possible
favorable incident or event is played up – and often deliberately staged or manufactured – to
promote the credit of management, employer and business groups and to create an impression
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that everything these groups do is done with the purest of unselfish motives, entirely for the
national welfare.”84 What is more revealing were repeated assertions that labor was losing the
war of public relations and that its image was being tarnished in the papers and to the public by
various reactionary groups. This story was published in the midst of the escalation of the UMW
strike waves and stood out in sharp contrast to the deluge of anti-labor vitriol.
The Smith-Connally Act was tested and used against the large 1944 hate strike in
Philadelphia among transit workers. The army was called in to seize and operate the public
transit system of the city. Thirty strikers were indicted and called to trial before a federal court.
This strike wounded the public opinion of the CIO even further, as the members of an ostensibly
progressive labor organization walked off of the job due to the promotion of 8 black employees.
As the war approached its conclusion, strikes skyrocketed. The effort and hope of the SmithConnally Act end labor strikes was met with a staggering 1,791,000 workers who walked off of
the job in the first 6 months of 1945.85 The immediate aftermath of the war also beheld the
largest strike waves in US history along with labor’s influence cresting to its high water mark in
spite of the wartime vitriol.
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Chapter 5: Tides
The events that were described in this thesis happened at a critical time in American
history. After years of violent struggle, the 1930’s and 40’s represented the peak of labor
resurgence. The Great Depression’s galvanizing effect on the complacency that welfare
capitalism elicited created a more militant and emboldened working class. In this era of
economic depression, they took on and won hitherto unfathomable victories against titanic
corporations such as General Motors and Ford through political agitation and strikes. The 1940’s
and the story of wildcat strikes were also times of turbulence among Americans and especially
workers. Old seasoned unionists were drafted into the armed forces, previously excluded groups
of workers poured into such industrial centers as Detroit, Pittsburgh, or Birmingham, and the key
weapon of unions – the strike – was disarmed through patriotic fervor. However, due to the
cacophony of racial tensions, managerial abuses, wage stagnation, and dangerous working
conditions, this weapon of workers exploded in spontaneous eruptions of anger and frustration.
Public opinion was galvanized, hatred flew across the airwaves and newspaper headlines
like bullets in the warzones of Europe and the Pacific islands. Workers were castigated as
traitorous, lazy, greedy, and allies of the enemy. Some, including notable references in the
military, fought back against this hatred with incendiary language of their own and added dried
kindling to the wildfire of public anger about these wildcat strikes. Public opinion poll after
public opinion poll showed a majority of the nation’s respondents were marching in step with the
anti-labor rhetoric of the newspapers. Congress was swayed under intense pressure to pass a law
which criminalized strikes and was designed to punish and diminish labor’s ability to function as
a political and social power. Instead of easing tensions, however, strikes rose to meteoric levels
as the war ground to a halt. They continued to climb to unheard of levels immediately after the
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war as general strikes rocked the nation. Labor’s power in the tides of history was at an all-time
high.
Even the highest tide must recede to lower and more tepid conditions. Seasons passed,
and with-it labor’s influence dwindled. It happened slowly at first, then in a cascade in the late
1970’s and 1980’s as union dominated industries were sent overseas and labor’s appeal to the
new working class diminished. Now, two decades into the 21st century, working class politics is
slowly entering the dialogue of news anchors and into the minds of Americans. Political currents
are shifting and the future of current political arrangements appears uncertain.
Where does this humble story fit into the vivid tapestry of labor history? This thesis set
out to accomplish two tasks. First, it added information and context to a neglected niche of
labor’s story during World War II. Historians such as Nelson Lichtenstein, Martin Glaberman,
and Robert Zieger mentioned the existence of a public opinion firestorm which fed into the
passage of the Smith-Connally Act, but no one has focused on the framework of that debate.
How did Americans conceptualize the act of striking during wartime? Were there unlikely
supporters of the striking workers? How did newspapers feed the fires of the public’s anger?
These were all questions that this thesis addressed. These questions needed further investigation,
for without an understanding of what the public thought and why, the post-war actions of labor
cannot be fully understood.
The second objective that this thesis accomplished was to illustrate the manifold
challenges in interpreting public opinion. A contradiction arises between this narrative, which
represented a cross-section of belief and opinion and the general historical narrative of labor
history. The post-war period of American history was seen as a high-water mark for labor’s
influence in politics and in the workplace. This was the summit of union membership, as roughly
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1/3rd of the working population was unionized. Progressive ideas, such as corporations sharing
profits with workers and universal health care, entered the public mind and were entertained. For
example, in January of 1946, 62% of respondents in a Gallup Poll thought that profit sharing was
a good idea.86 The embrace of such ideas in modern times swiftly earned a person odd looks and
suspicion that one was a communist. Herein lies the contradiction: how could the public shift
from a visceral hatred of labor unions during the war to the pinnacle of labor’s influence in the
matter of months? Public opinion does not quickly recede and such hatred is not often easily
forgotten.
There is a possible answer to this bizarre juxtaposition of events which lies in the fault
inherent in measuring public opinion. It is difficult to accurately capture someone’s full belief
with a few questions. Variables such as a person’s ever shifting moods, familiarity or ignorance
to the issue, and the wording of polling questions exert sway over how the results will be
portrayed and interpreted. Late in 1946, Arthur Kornhauser, a member of the Bureau of Applied
Social Research at Columbia University, published a repudiation of polls concerning labor in
Public Opinion Quarterly, the very place which published these polls throughout the war.
Kornhauser selected all public opinion polls about labor between 1940-1945 and evaluated these
155 polls for fairness in their representation of labor; only 8 were friendly to labor. The results
were quite telling. “The polls aid and abet the process of directing public attention persistently to
the negative side of organized labor.”87 This study suggested that instruments which measured
public opinion did so with loaded questions and flawed interpretations of the results. Many
questions offered a false dichotomy between ignoring strikes and a law-oriented solution. These
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questions “follow the formula: a choice between the evil of wartime strikes and the proposed
remedy of a law. Majorities of 69 percent to 86 percent voted for a law… the published results
led to the spurious conclusion that the public overwhelmingly favored new legislation as the
remedy. The reports thus supported the hand of the groups campaigning for anti-strike laws."88 If
solutions were proffered that involved unions internally adopting stronger measures to
discourage strikes, many members of the public would have probably favored this choice.89
Therefore, while the public was perturbed and angered by strikes, the options that were presented
to them were narrow and false. This fueled newspaper stories and anti-labor pundits who relied
on the ethos of popular support. It further influenced the debates over the Smith-Connally Act,
where supporters of the bill claimed to be acting in accordance to the will of the people.
Kornhauser also discovered that many respondents were answering complicated
questions of which they knew little about. “The error lies in the use of specific question content
to tap general attitudes. Bias is introduced by the pretense that the respondents possess
information on the particular matters when, in fact, they have no such knowledge.”90 Citizens
could elucidate a general displeasure with strikes during wartime and desire a solution, but when
the issues were over-simplified and presented in such a way where there was a logical answer to
a patriotic American, support was expressed for anti-labor solutions that were not understood.
This also may serve to explain in part the high percentage of war workers who supported antistrike legislation. Kornhauser concluded that “compulsory arbitration and no-strike laws, for
example, seem like desirable solutions to many housewives, farmers, and other average
Americans who lack knowledge of what these measures entail-their practical limitations and
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drawbacks-and what possible alternatives exist.”91 Thus, the great zeitgeist of righteous anger
was based on false pretenses and arbiters who had clear vested interests against labor. This also
draws interesting parallels to modern American politics with the confoundment felt by many by
President Trump’s election despite public opinion and electoral polls assuring the opposite
conclusion.
A second contradiction that this thesis addressed in the examination of worker’s attitudes
was the strong support of workers of the No-Strike Pledge and the incidence of many of those
same workers engaging in wildcat strikes. How are historians to make sense of this? One theory
believes that while workers nominally supported the idea of the No-Strike Pledge, alienating
circumstances and restricted avenues of redress necessitated strikes. These strikes were not at
first political in nature, they were over narrow work-related issues. However, the nature of the
vitriolic attacks against strikes by the media, public, and government magnified the issue and
turned it into a political issue. “The firings, use of the draft against militants, arrests and
harassments, were directed not against what workers thought but what workers did. And in turn,
what workers thought was changed by what those in power did. The wildcat strikes were, in fact
political strikes because they were directed against the government. The government through
military and other personnel, made sure to make that clear.”92 If this interpretation is to be
accepted, the strikes multiplied and assumed a more political cast due to the increased stakes
caused by the passage of the Smith-Connally Act, which was ostensibly justified by public
support which was misrepresented.
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This contradiction of workers support of anti-strike attitudes and wildcat strikes could
also be interpreted through similar lenses as public opinion. It is hard to represent the multidimensional complexities of the human soul through interviews or polls. A worker who filled out
a No-Strike Pledge ballot while listening to war news on the radio would not see a contradiction
in walking off the job the next day when they are assigned to menial and hated work by the
foreman.93 “If there were ten other workers involved, they may have had 10 different
combinations of attitudes for joining the strike. These could range from aggressive militancy
through a belief or sense of class consciousness to a lack of interest or fear.”94
Wildcat strikes did not disappear from the American mind after the end of the war. They
continued to be a commonality of labor relations until the 1980’s. The Smith-Connally Act,
therefore, cemented its place in American history as the progenitor of aggressive anti-labor laws
which targeted the right to strike. Only two years after the end of the war, the Taft-Hartley Act
was passed which furthered the Smith-Connally Act’s attack on the political power of unions.
Closed-Shops, or workplaces that only hired union members was outlawed. The bill attempted to
drive a wedge between employees and the unions that represented them. The Taft-Hartley Act,
while met with significant opposition from labor at its strongest, greatly benefitted from the
legacy of the Smith-Connally Act which acted as a forerunner of hostile legislation. Further antilabor laws such as the Right to Work legislation, which is still the law in over half of American
states, built on the anti-worker foundations laid down by the Smith-Connally Act. This oft
overlooked bill was the first in a long line of legislation that was hostile to the collective
bargaining power of workers which still holds sway over many Americans today.
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